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ABSTRACT
An analysis of the Fan Piers project's three years of development
review (1985-1988) was undertaken in order to have a better
understanding of Boston's negotiated development review for large-
scale development projects. Newspaper and journal articles, materials
submitted for Boston Redevelopment Authority and Zoning Commission
approval, and key participants in the review process were consulted for
the evaluation of the development review for this megaproject. A
number of economic, political, and project-specific factors that affected
the review process were explored, and the nature of policy linkages,
procedural guidelines, and citizen participation served as the criteria for
determining the fairness and efficiency of the process.
This analysis found that a variety of factors had an effect on the outcomes of
the negotiations for the Fan Piers. These factors include: Boston's booming,
office economy; the perceptions of developer profits; the City's reliance on
property taxes; the Mayoral elections; the high degree of citizen organization;
tensions between state and local levels of government; the scale and density
of the project; the developers' marketing techniques; and the timing of the
project. It was also clear that in Boston, both policy-making and procedures
for development review are in a state of transition and subject to continual
change. The development review process was found to be unfair and
inefficient due to a general lack of well- defined policies and poorly-
articulated development review procedures. Citizen participation appeared to
be strong, but questions of whether citizens were truly empowered by the
process remain unanswered. The Fan Piers Development review is an
example of an unpredictable, time-consuming process in which the regulating
agency had most of the power concentrated in its own hands.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Michael Wheeler
Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
On January 20, 1988, readers of the Boston Globe were confronted with
the bold headlines. After six years of planning and intense negotiations,
the owner and the developers of the massive Fan Piers Development in
Boston's Fort Point Channel area were taking each other to court for
what would surely turn out to be a grueling, controversial, and
acrimonious confrontation. To most observers, the bad blood between
Anthony Athanas, the owner of the site, and HBC Associates, the
developers of the Fan Pier, most likely signals the end to what has often
been touted as Boston's largest development project ever.
For five years, the Fan Piers, a proposed 4,8 million square foot, mixed-
use development of hotel, office, retail, and residential uses on the
waterfront was Bostons' most visible and controversial development
proposal. Between 1985 and 1988, the project's developers, city and
state officials, and a citizen advisory committee participated in a
complex series of negotiations to assess the costs and benefits of this
complex project. These players also attempted to hammer out
agreements on appropriate developer exactions, contributions, and
mitigation measures for the project. The three years of negotiated
development review that preceded the developers' lawsuits are the
subject of this thesis.
The Fan Pier's elaborate negotiated development review process is a
reflection of cities' increased concern over the potential social, economic,
and environmental impacts of large-scale developments. Planners and
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the development review process continually seek to balance the
economic and fiscal benefits that a project brings to the city with the
social costs and negative environmental impacts that it may also have.
This is a particularly difficult task for such megaprojects as the Fan
Piers Development because large-scale projects differ significantly from
their smaller, more routine counterparts in terms of scale, impacts,
players and policy issues. Some of the key differences are outlined
below:
1) Scale: Most development projects, are large and complex. They
often involve a number of different types of uses and are generally
located in urban areas, in close proximity to industrial, commercial, and
residential zones. These large-scale projects take years to plan, and can
change considerably in both design and concept over that time.
2) Impacts: Most development projects have a wide variety of impacts,
ranging from increased traffic to the displacement of adjacent low-
income neighbors. The exactions and conditions placed on such
developments are also numerous. It often becomes difficult to clearly
draw a link between impacts and exactions.
3) The Players: A variety of local, regional, state, and federal agencies
may be involved in the regulatory review process of a large scale
development project. Community groups, non-profit groups such as the
Sierra Club or Fair Share, and other interested parties such as local
businessmen, also often become involved in the development review
process.
4) Policy Issues: A large-scale development project in a tightly-knit
metropolitan area cannot be considered in isolation of the overall,
comprehensive policies and visions for the city. Furthermore, in a
complex urban environment, many policy issues overlap with one
another and are not easily disentangled.
Given that most large-scale development projects in metropolitan areas
involve this multiplicity of issues, impacts, regulation, and interested
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parties, as well as considerable uncertainty, it is clear that they require
a special development review process. Over the past two decades, a
number of techniques have been employed across the country as cities
seek to develop a fair and efficient process to assess - the costs and
benefits of large-scale development. Many localities have concluded
that traditional, Euclidean zoning techniques are too rigid and hence,
ineffective. Instead, they have turned to more flexible techniques of
negotiated development review, planned urban development (PUD)
zonings, and exactions as they seek to avoid, minimize, reduce, rectify or
compensate for the adverse impacts of development. More and more
often, planners are negotiating with developers over mitigation
techniques, impact fees, public amenities, exactions and linkage
formulas that will minimize the costs of development while still
allowing communities and developers to reap their benefits. These
negotiated development review techniques have been praised for the
flexibility and creativity that they brings to land-use regulations. They
have also been alternatingly criticized for either promoting arbitrary
and unreasonable development exactions or for allowing developers to
"get away with murder".
The goal of this thesis is to assess how well such a negotiated
development review process worked for one highly complex, large-scale
development project in Boston: the Fan Piers Development. Two
questions shall guide the analysis of the Fan Piers development review
process: 1) What external and project-specific factors affected the
outcomes of the negotiations?
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2) Was the negotiated development review of the Fan Piers
development fair and efficient? In order to answer the first question,
this thesis explores the economic, political, and project-specific factors
that had a significant impact on the three years of development
negotiations. The questions of fairness and efficiency are addressed by
a careful analysis of the policy linkages, procedural guidelines, and the
role of citizen participation in the development review process.
The first three chapters of this thesis are descriptive. Chapter One,
Negotiated Development Review, explores the nature of
development review in the United States over the past century. The
first half of this chapter describes the evolution of land-use controls
from the traditional Euclidean zoning regulations of the 1920s to the
negotiated development reviews and developer exaction techniques in
existence today. This section also explores why negotiated development
review is so commonly used nowadays and what its strengths and
weaknesses are. The second half of the chapter discusses two criteria
that can be used to evaluate development review processes: fairness
and efficiency.
Chapter Two, The Fan Piers Development, introduces the reader to
the controversial Fan Piers Development. This chapter describes the
development proposal and provides us with a historical and
geographical background to the Fort Point Channel area of Boston,
where the Fan Pier is located. The costs and benefits of the
development project itself are also described here. The chapter
concludes with a description of the multiple parties involved in this
9
negotiated development review process. These include the BRA, the
Citizen Advisory Committee, numerous private interest coalitions, the
Mayor, the Governor, and the President of the State Senate. These
players have different interests and amounts of power in the planning
and development review process, but in sum total they create the
unique political context of the Fan Pier Development.
Chapter Three, Development Review of the Fan Piers, turns to
development review processes in Boston in general and for the Fan Pier
in particular. This chapter begins with a description of Boston's
planning context and then turns to three critical components of the Fan
Pier's development review process: policy linkages, procedures, and
citizen participation. The second half of the chapter documents four of
the most critical issues--density of development, waterfront access,
traffic mitigations and affordable housing--negotiated between the
development team, government agencies, and area residents. These
four issues were chosen in order highlight some critical points
concerning development review and developer exactions in Boston.
Chapters four and five are analytical in nature. Chapter Four,
Factors Affecting the Development Review Process, explores the
impact that Boston's development market, perceived developer profits,
local politics, citizen organization, project-size and marketing techniques
had on the nature of the development review process and the exactions
obtained from the developers. These political, economic, and project-
specific factors have a tremendous impact on negotiations and yet, they
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are rarely formally recognized for the role that they play in
development review.
Chapter Five, An Analysis of the Fan Pier Develo-pment Review
Process, assesses the development review process to which the Fan
Pier was subjected by exploring the policy linkages, procedural
guidelines and role of citizen participation in the process. The first
section of this chapter focuses on Boston's transition in policy-making,
why policies existed in some areas and not others, and what
implications this had for the development review of the Fan Piers. The
second section discusses the procedural guidelines for development
review and assesses the implications of unpredictable procedures and
undefined rules for the scoping of issues, choice of impact studies, and
determination of time horizons. The third section of this chapter turns
to citizen participation and explores it implications for process. Issues
such as public scrutiny, thoroughness, and lengthiness of the review
process are discussed here. The chapter concludes with some
observations of the fairness and efficiency of the Fan Pier's negotiated
development review process.
Chapter Six, Recommendations to Planners and Policy-Makers,
is primarily prescriptive in nature. Based on the findings in Chapters
Four and Five, this chapter presents various recommendations for
improving the fairness and efficiency of policy linkages, procedures,
and citizen participation within the negotiated development review
process. Finally, Chapter Six seeks to demonstrate that development
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review processes that allow for flexibility and negotiation need not be
arbitrary and unreasonable.
Today, the Fan Piers Development has been put on hold because its
owner and one of its developers are in court, battling over a contractual
disagreement. The outcome of this litigation and the consequences for
the development project are presently unknown. Thus, this thesis
focuses only on the three year period between 1985, when the master
plan was first unveiled, to January of 1988 when the lawsuits were
publicly announced. Whether or not the development project goes
ahead as planned, it is important for public officials, citizen groups, and
developers to assess the development review process in order to correct
its flaws and build upon its strong points.
Planning in Boston is, in many ways, unique. After years of stagnation,
this Northeastern city has undergone an unprecedented development
boom over the past eight years. With the exception, perhaps, of San
Francisco, few other planning agencies in large cities have as much
discretionary administrative power and control over urban
development projects. Furthermore, planned urban developments are
rarely found in most American cities today. Nonetheless, a number of
critical variables of the Fan Pier can also be found in similar
developments throughout the United States. Thus, it is hoped that the
findings of this thesis will not only aid Boston officials in their
development review process, but may also be applicable to other large-
scale development reviews around the country.
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CHAPTER ONE
NEGOTIATED DEVELOPMENT REVIEW
Land-use issues have always been a source of heated debate in the
United States. In this country, wealth and power are intimately linked
to how we use our land: the development of a piece of land can produce
windfall profits to the individual landowner, enormous benefits to the
community, and/or tangible costs to the surrounding neighbors. Over
the years, Americans have grown to believe that local government
should regulate development in order to achieve outcomes that are in
the interest of the general health, safety and welfare of the community
(Kayden and Pollard, 1987, p.7). However, the individual's freedom to
do what he pleases with his land has also long been a basic tenet of
American doctrine and thus, our regulation of land-use is laden with
ideological and symbolic meanings (de Neufville, 1981) as well as
considerable controversy.
The ways in which we regulate land-use and development have
changed considerably over the past two decades as localities have
moved away from traditional, Euclidean zoning techniques and towards
more flexible and innovative forms of negotiated development review.
These new flexible techniques have been used in Boston for some years
now, and characterized the development review of the Fan Piers. The
fi1st half of this chapter documents the evolrtion of these development
review processes over the past century. The chapter then seeks to
establish two criteria upon which we can judge both the development
review process and their substantive outcomes.
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Traditional Development Review: Zoning
Two events are often regarded as the beginning of formal land-use
planning in the United States. In the 1920s the U.S. Supreme Court
validated the use of zoning in the now famous, Euclid v-s. Ambler case
and in 1928, the U.S. Commerce Department published the Standard
Planning Enabling Act, which served as the model for state statutes for
local government and planning across the country. Euclidean zoning
essentially divided the urban landscape into separate and distinct
geographic areas of a particular land use. Inconsistent uses such as
industrial and residential activities were separated from one another
and building and site characteristics such as height, bulk, and setbacks
had to meet specific, enumerated minimum standards. Together with,
the Standard Planning Enabling Act, which required the provision of
streets, water mains, sewer lines and other utilities as conditions for
building approval (Frank and Downing, 1988 p. 1), euclidean zoning
formed the basis for almost all municipal development review
between 1920 and 1960.
The lot by lot regulations imposed by zoning were well-received by
many landowners and the public because people could know in advance
what was or was not permitted. Despite their design rigidity, the zoning
ordinances also provided a degree of certainty and efficiency to the
regulatory process as they theoretically allowed for little discretion by
municipal authorities. Over the years, however, a number of additional
variations were added to the traditional zoning review including
variances, exceptions and rezoning amendments. These allowed for
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increasing flexibility and discretionary administrative review within the
old framework of rigid zoning standard
Negotiated Development Review: PUDs, Negotiations &
Exactions
As land development became increasingly complex, our perceptions of
land regulation began to change. Between 1920 and the 1960s, it was
an unquestioned civic responsibility in this country that local
government should facilitate growth, and hence build the facilities and
infrastructure to support that growth (Frank and Downing, 1988, p.1).
In the 1960s, however, after more than forty years of the status quo,
the environmental movement spurred a quiet revolution, shattering
America's faith in the benefits of growth (Frank and Downing, 1988,
p.1). The problems of traffic congestion, air and water pollution, and
inadequate services were beginning to mount, and booming growth no
longer seemed to provide all of the answers to America's problems. The
fiscal crunch of the 1970s and 1980s reinforced the changes in planning
outlook which had already begun in the sixties. The growing power of
grassroots community groups and no-growth forces, the increased use
of state tax caps limiting local government's capacity to raise new
revenues, the legislation of the Environmental Quality Act requiring the
mitigation of adverse impacts in the 1970s, and the the new federalism
of the Reagan administration in the 1980s forced governments to take
an even closer look at how they weighed the costs and benefits of
growth.
Increasingly, governments shifted from the perspective that land was a
private commodity resource to be used up by those who pay the most,
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to a position that land was a common good to be protected by local
government (DeNeufville, 1981). This emphasis on the collective good
over the the individual' s freedom to choose was accompanied by a
movement away from traditional zoning and towards project-by-project
review. Development review processes, characterized by bargaining
between the city and a developer over project character and the nature
of the compensatory payments, began to replace the traditional,
Euclidean zoning process that had reigned for more than forty years in
most of the United States. This new flexible development review
included a wide variety of techniques including planned unit
developments, negotiated development review, and exactions. These
techniques are described below:
Planned Unit Developments (PUDs)
Planned unit developments, commonly referred to as PUDs, were
created in response to the "wait and see" zoning which had evolved over
the years in many American cities. Wait and see zoning was essentially
a way to indirectly give municipal authorities more discretionary power
in the review process. According to this technique, a city would prepare
a map classifying most undeveloped land in a relatively restrictive
category, thus forcing a developer to seek an amendment from the
legislative body (Frank and Rhodes, 1987, p. 83). This roundabout
technique continues to be widely-used cities such as Boston.
PUDs emerged in the 1960s when suburban developers and planners
agreed to the the concept of a unified master plan new residential
communities. As an alternative to traditional zoning, a PUD is both a
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physical plan and a legal concept for it allows for development that
differs both in product and in process from as- of-right zoning
regulations. PUD designations allow the traditional yard, lot, and bulk
regulations of Euclidean zoning to be relaxed so that development
projects of a substantial size can be evaluated on the basis of their own
merits. Very little is required in the way of specific standards for site
layout, and instead, an open-ended process of negotiated review takes
place in order to create a master plan for the site. Extensive bargaining
between the developers, who seek special zoning allowances for the site,
and local officials, who seek added amenities from the large-scale
project, is not unusual in such a process.
Negotiations
Today, negotiations occur between developers and government
officials not only for PUDs but in all areas of development review
including project benefits, exactions, phasing of development, types of
land-uses, design and zoning standards, and impacts assessment. Such
negotiations often are informal with considerable room for -bargaining.
Over time, however, many of the informal bargaining processes become
formalized as a culture of negotiation is developed that binds both the
developer and the municipality into a highly predictable process (Frank
and Rhodes, 1987, p. 29). This movement away from conventional
zoning and toward administrative review has occurred because both
municipalities and developers are seeking increased flexibility and a
development review process that is sensitive to the unique
circumstances of each project's timing, physical details, and location.
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Negotiated development review, which originated with growth control
measures and PUDs in the suburbs and with urban renewal projects in
large cities, has served to legitimize the legislative discretion of
municipalities to discourage development or exact large contributions
from developers (Frank and Rhodes, 1987, p.83). It also provides a
legal opportunity for open-ended bargaining between developers in the
city. A lack of accountability arises in many cases as there is no clear
decision point and the negotiations suffer from a lack of closure (Cowart
and Kesmodel, 1985, p. 37). Some municipalities have attempted to
resolve the uncertainty of the negotiation process by creating
development agreements, "contracts between local governments and
developers that suspend the ability of the local government to change
the land use regulations applicable to the project for the length of the
agreement" (Cowart and Kesmodel, 1985, p. 1).
Exactions
A significant component of the negotiated development review process
has been the use of a number of new tools designed to mitigate and
compensate for the negative impacts of development. These come
under a variety of names including exactions, mitigations, impact fees,
and linkage payments, each with their own subtle variation in meaning.
All of these tools can be grouped under the heading of exactions. In this
broad sense, we can define exactions as conditions required by
government authorities for the carrying forward of a project. In other
words, an exactions is "a contribution by a developer to a municipality
which is ordinarily a condition precedent to the issuance of a special
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permit, a conditional use permit, a subdivision approval, or an
amendment to a zoning map" (Connors, 1987, p. 1).
Subdivision exactions, such as the dedication of land for streets, sewer
lines, schools, and recreational facilities, have routinely been used for
decades. The increasing use of off-site exactions, designed to mitigate a
development's negative impacts on the surrounding community have
been much more controversial. These off-site exactions, which include
impact fees, mitigation measures, and linkage payments, are described
below.
Impact Fees
"Impact fees are charges levied by local governments against
developers in order to generate the revenues for capital funding
necessitated by the new development" (Connors et al., 1987, p. 9).
General impact fees generally consist of single payment to be made by
the developer or builder at the time of development approval. They are
usually calculated by a formula which seeks to measure the
development's proportionate share of the capital cost of providing major
facilities such as roads, sewage treatment plants, and regional parks
which will be necessitated by growth (Frank and Downing, 1988, p. 2).
Studies by Downing and Frank found that communities prefer not to
leave the determination of impact fees to negotiation, with 80% of the
communities surveyed nationally using either a formula or a published
schedule to determine the fees (Frank and Downing, 1988, p.16).
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The use of development impact fees has increased dramatically, and is
now commonly found outside of the states of Florida and California
where the fees originated. For municipalities, impact fees tend to be a
relatively easy tool to implement and although developers would rather
do without the added payments altogether, they favor the fees'
predictable formula which provides them with some certainty of
impending exactions. Unlike, negotiated exactions and mitigation
measures, statutory impact fees allow a developer to work the added
costs into a pro forma before he is well into the development review
process.
Mitigation Measures
Mitigations are actions that are required of a developer to avoid,
minimize, reduce, rectify, or compensate for the adverse impacts of his
or her proposed development (Phillips, 1987, p. 36). The most
controversial mitigation measures are those which are off-site and out
of kind such as when a local government requires a developer to build a
park three miles away in order to compensate for the increased
congestion which his or her development will create.
Linkage Payments
Linkage fees, introduced in Boston and San Francisco in the early 1980s,
are the most recent and controversial types of exactions. In order to
obtain development approval, developers in cities with linkage
programs must either build low and moderate income units themselves
or contribute linkage payments based on square footage of development
to a special affordable housing fund. The underlying logic for linkage
20
formulas is that commercial and office developments attract new
workers, who increase the demand for housing, pushing up rents and
housing costs, and reducing the affordability of urban housing. This
indirect causal connection between new office development and
affordable housing has been deemed sufficient by a number of
governments to justify the request for linkage from developers.
Negotiated Development Review: EIRs & Citizen Participation
The advent of flexible development review techniques was
accompanied by a new role for both state governments and citizens in
local development review. This state and citizen involvement was
fomented by federal NEPA and CDBG regulations, which encouraged
both a regional perspective and increased citizen participation in
governmental decisions.
State Environmental Impact Reviews (EIRs)
Rapid growth and development in the 1950s and 1960s prompted
public interest in conservation and environmental protection, and by
the late 1960s considerable pressure was being exerted in Congress for
reform. Hence, in 1969 the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
established nationwide procedures and standards for the
environmental impact review (EIR) of large scale development projects.
Since that time, many states, including Massachusetts, have set up
similar EIR programs. The EIR process applies to most large-scale
development projects in need of state permits and requires that
developers and local officials meet with the citizenry to scope out the
relevant issues, measure the impacts of different project alternatives,
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and propose mitigation measures for negative impacts. These analyses
and recommendations are then incorporated into draft and final
environmental impact reports, which are often used to supplement the
local development review process.
Although the EIR has no authority to demand that the mitigation
proposals be implemented, it has added a new layer of scrutiny to local
development review. Proponents claim that environmental reviews
helop ensure that the environmental consequences of a project will be
accounted for by decisionmakers. They also note that the reviews help
foment greater environmental awareness among developers and city
officials, and generally result in better, more environmentally-sensitive
projects.
Critics, however, argue that the environmental review regulations are
unfair and promote no-growth policies designed to exclude newcomers
from communities rather than mitigate environmental impacts.
Protracted disputes paralysing lawsuits, and other blocking tactics by
special interest groups result in costly delays and oftentimes,
development deadlocks. Many observers now believe that
environmental reviews have been abused and do not fulfill their initial
intent of balancing the costs and benefits of development. Bernard
Frieden in his book "The Environmental Protection Hustle" notes:
"Development reviews in practice seldom generate meaningful new
information for decision-makers. Their main function is political: to
give the opposition time to organize and repeated chances to block
construction" (Frieden, 1979, p. 177).
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Citizen Participation
The grassroots mobilization of citizen groups in the 1970s has had a
significant impact on development review processes. Residents no
longer trust that planners will speak on their behalf. Nor are they
willing to have their opinions relegated to the public hearing which
traditionally comes at the end of the development review process. In
response to this increasingly vocal segment of the population, a number
of cities have established citizen or neighborhood advisory councils that
review development proposals and provide their recommendations to
the municipality. In some cases, residents are even demanding that
they be able to sit at the negotiating table with developers and
government officials.
Grassroots activism has changed the nature of community involvement
in the development review process considerably. This increased public
participation in development review has been applauded by many.
Others, however, note that representational issues still plague the
process and that many citizen groups have their own self-interest and
exclusionary desires at heart rather than the interests of the community
as a whole. Furthermore, in most cities, citizen participation in the
development review process continues to be on a reactive, rather than
pro-active basis. Citizen participation or not, the final decision-making
continues to lie in the hands of local government administrators.
23
An Evaluation of Negotiated Development Review
Negotiated Development Review: The Pros and Cons
Over the past two decades, flexible development review techniques
such as PUDs, negotiated development review, and exactions have
become increasingly popular. There is considerable debate, however,
over the merits of such techniques. Critics argue that the open-ended
bargaining for development approvals makes the developer hostage to
voluntary payments, arbitrarily determined by the regulatory agency.
Many developers would agree, arguing that the negotiation process
amounts to extortion. A question of accountability also exists since it is
not always clear who has the authority to make final, binding decisions
and when the review has reached closure. Proponents, however, note
that the new negotiated development foments increased flexibility in
the review process. Negotiations allow planners to respond thoughtfully
to the individual merits and costs of each project , rather than relying
on overly broad, rigid regulations. This argument holds that negotiated
development review encourages creativity and innovative solutions by
developers and designers rather than the traditional "just meet the
minimum standards" approach.
Which argument is correct? Clearly, both proponents and critics of
flexible development reviews have some valid points. Since every
negotiated development review process is different, it is difficult to
generalize across cities and sometimes, even across cases. For this
reason, this thesis examines only one particular case, that of the Fan
Piers Development in order to draw lessons for the City of Boston. What
can we learn from the Fan Piers case about the use of flexible zoning
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techniques in Boston today? Is Boston's model of negotiated
development review a good one? How could it be improved?
In order to answer these questions, this thesis undertakes different
types of analysis of the Fan Piers development review process. Chapter
Four explores some the external and project-specific factors that we
believe influenced the negotiated review process in order to have a
better understanding of why the review proceeded as it did. Chapter
Five then evaluates the development review process in terms of its
fairness and efficiency. The assumptions for this analysis are described
below.
Criteria for Evaluation: Fairness and -Efficiency
This thesis asserts that the development review process should be both
fair and efficient from all parties' perspectives. Fairness and efficiency
of the Fan Piers development review process can be evaluated by
focusing on three key components of any development review process:
policy linkages, procedural guidelines, and citizen participation.
A fair development review process allows for similar projects to be
treated similarly, regardless of who is proposing them (U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, 1980). This includes equal access
to well-defined policies, procedures that allow for a thorough review of
project costs and benefits, and for opportunities for all relevant parties
to express their concerns. A fair review process includes the following
characteristics:
Policy Linkages : Policy linkages are clear. Plans and policies are clear
to all parties. The criteria and standards which serve as the basis for
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decisions are well known to all ahead of time. There is a consistent
treatment of developments over time and across projects.
Procedures: Procedures for review are predictable. 'The rules of the
game are clearly established ahead of time or at the beginning of the
process so that all of the players know and understand .the procedures
as well as each party's roles in the process. Each party is responsible
and accountable for its actions. The procedures should also establish a
review process which is thorough and addresses all of the issues. A
balance is achieved in reviewing project costs and benefits and the total
benefits to all parties outweigh the total costs.
Participation: Participation is equitable. All relevant stakeholders are
given an equal chance to participate in the process. The people who
manage the process are open and responsive to the views and concerns
of these participants. (Susskind, 1987, p. 27). All individuals involved
in the process should also have adequate access to information. Finally,
a fair process is open to public scrutiny and those involved are
accountable to the constituencies they ostensibly represent.
An efficient development review process, on the other hand, is one
which analyzes problems in light of the municipality's development
objectives and proposes solutions that waste the fewest resources in
attaining them. An efficient exaction process is one which does not take
an inordinately long time, which does not have excessive monetary
costs to one or more parties, and which can achieve "elegant outcomes".
Elegant trades are those exchanges that benefit all parties without
penalizing any (Susskind, 1987, p. 32). An efficient process includes the
following characteristics:
Policy Linkages: Policies are clearly stated and are designed to remedy
the actual problem, rather than indirectly solving other unstated
problems. In other words, large lots are not required when people are
actually concerned about automobile traffic or racial integration.
Procedures: Clear-cut procedures for review reduce uncertainty for all
parties and avoid a long, drawn out process. Procedures should not be
so rigid, however, as to result in unnecessary reviews. Procedures are
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designed so that resources are not wasted. Only as many studies or as
many meetings as are necessary are held. Data and technical studies
should equally available to all parties so that well-informed choices can
be made be made the first time round.
Participation: Those parties who are directly affected by the
development impact under consideration provide input at the
appropriate moment in the process. Outspoken, special interest groups
are not allowed to dominate the negotiation of impacts. Negotiations
only extend as long as is necessary.
Clearly, certain tensions exist between the goals of fairness and
efficiency. A fair process which allows for the most thorough review
possible of all impacts, for example, may not be very efficient. Or an
efficient review process which ignores the voice of certain extreme
outlier groups, may be unfair. Planners must always weigh these trade-
offs against one another, however, and seek a review process which
maximizes both fairness and efficiency. It should also be noted that a
process that seems to maximize efficiency in the short-run, may indeed
be less efficient in the long run. Hence, this thesis' assertion that an
efficient review process includes citizen participation. By including the
affected players early on in the negotiations, delays due to litigation and
public hearings protests can be avoided. Efficiency and fairness in the
long term will create stable outcomes, that all parties can accept.
Conclusions
In many ways the development review of Boston's Fan Piers
Development, was typical of the flexible review processes commonly
used today. The Fan Pier was Boston's first planned urban development
(referred to as a Master Plan, Planned Development Area or MPDA in
Boston). The project was also subject to extensive negotiated
development review, and a wide range of exactions were demanded of
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the developers. Furthermore, a state environmental impact review was
conducted simultaneously with the local PDA review of the Fan Piers.
Finally, citizen participation was an integral component of the Fan Piers'
review process. These features of the review process are discussed in
greater detail in Chapters Two and Three.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE FAN PIERS DEVELOPMENT
This chapter provides a brief description of the Pier Four/Fan Pier
developments and their geographic, historical, and political context. The
geography and historical evolution of the Fort Point Channel area and
the greater South Boston neighborhood provide important clues as to
why Pier Four/Fan Pier projects are so desirable to developers, yet
controversial among residents and government agencies. A project of
this magnitude generates a wide variety of costs and benefits. Not
surprisingly, a number of interest groups have coalesced around the
different issues. The perspectives and interests of these different
players are described in the political context. section of this chapter.
Project Description
What is commonly known as the Fan Piers Development, is actually two
adjacent development projects: the Fan Pier and Pier Four. South
Boston's Fan Pier is a 19 acre site (2.6 acres of which are under water)
that is being developed by HBC Associates, a joint-venture, limited
partnership affiliated with the Hyatt Corporation. A portion of the site
is actually owned by HBC Associates while the remainder is ground-
leased from Anthony Athanas, who also owns Pier Four. HBC Associates
proposes to build a hotel, various office buildings, retail uses, luxury
residential units, and possibly a public cultural facility on the Fan Pier.
The Boston Mariner Company, Inc., owned by the Athanas family, is
developing the adjacent Pier Four site. This 16.4 acre parcel consists of
8.9 acres of piers and upland area, with the remaining 7.5 acres lying
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below water. The Pier Four project is also a mixed-use development,
which includes office, hotel, and retail space, residential units, below-
grade parking and recreational open space. Together, these two projects
are expected to add a total of 4.8 million square feet of mixed-use
development to the City of Boston (Figures 1 and 2) The developers
estimate that their total development costs will be 1.1 billion dollars.
Although these two projects have separate developers, Anthony
Athanas owns both sites and both the local and state level development
reviews have focused on the proposals in conjunction with one another.
This thesis shall also address both projects jointly, and will refer to
them as the Fan Piers Development.
Geographic Context
The proposed Fan Piers Development lies along the northern shore of
the South Boston in the vicinity of the Fort Point Channel (Figure 3). A
number of bridges span the channel and link the predominantly blue-
collar South Boston community with downtown Boston's financial
district. The immediate area surrounding the Fan Pier is industrially-
zoned and is composed of 300 acres of warehouses, offices, light
manufacturing, exhibition space, large parking lots, piers, and
underutilized railroad yards. A majority of the area's jobs are related to
the printing and publishing, food processing, and leather and apparel
industries or are in Gillette Park (Boston Redevelopment Authority,
1985). In addition to the warehouses and retail fishing businesses,
one can also find a number of restaurants and such popular attractions
as the Boston Tea Party Ship and the Children's Museum in this area.
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While the Fan Piers Development is located in the commercial and
industriaL northern portion of South Boston, the southern half of the
neighborhood is mostly residential. Affectionately referred to as
"Southie", South Boston has traditionally been a solid, stable working
class neighborhood. The predominantly white (97%) and Irish residents
of South Boston are primarily employed in manufacturing and the
construction industry. A large elderly population can also be found in
this area. Below average housing conditions prevail, and more than 75%
of the residents are renters, most of whom live in triple deckers or
small apartment buildings (Brown and Hafrey, 1985). For many, this
neighborhood has always been home: an astounding 63% of the
residents have lived in South Boston for at least thirty years (Boston
Globe, June 30, 1986).
Like many other Boston neighborhoods, however, Southie has
undergone considerable social and economic change over the past
decade. Young and affluent downtown professionals have begun to
move into the area, renovating the existing housing and building
townhouses on small infill lots. According to the BRA, this neighborhood
has experienced stronger than average growth of residential market
values over the last twenty years, particularly in the northern half of
the community (Arault and Seko, 1985), yet vacancy rates continue to
be less than 3% annually (Brown and Haffrey, 1987). Unable to afford
the skyrocketing prices, many long time residents live in homes that
were handed down to them by their families and do not have the
resources to improve housing conditions or pay higher rents.
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FIGURE 2: Model Photograph of the Fan Piers Development
AV
33
The Fan Piers Site and Surrounding Urban Area
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FIGURE 3:
The influx of newcomers has met with resistance from the close-knit,
South Boston community, which has a "tradition of proud parochialism"
(Boston Globe, July 30, 1986) stemming from its grounding in
conservative, Irish Catholic culture. This is a community known for
both its insularity and profound mistrust of outsiders, as well as its
strong instinct towards self-reliance. City Councillor James Kelly (South
Boston) once noted: "if we don't protect ourselves no one else will ... the
Irish sense of us and them will always be here" (Seiden Hayes, 1986 p.
70). Indeed, throughout the Fan Pier Development review process,
South Boston has made it clear that it is the type of neighborhood that
will fight to control its own destiny.
Historical Context
Fort Point Channel: 1800-1988
The Fan Piers' neighborhood was not always characterized by brick
warehouses and triple deckers, however. The Fort Point Channel,
originally marsh land and tidal flats, was created through land filling
which began as early as 1835. Land filling continued throughout the
early twentieth century as the fishing and wool processing industries
and the importation of lumber, steel, pig iron, rubber, and sugar
spurred Boston's ports into a flurry of activity. These record years of
port activity continued well into the 1920s. Following World War II,
however, technological changes in the industry led to considerable
erosion of the shipping and railroad industries in the region, and New
England lost its predominant role as a manufacturing center. Boston's
waterfront and the Fort Point Channel area began to experience
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considerable decline as warehouse were abandoned and the piers
deteriorated. Today, approximately 30% of the land is vacant, and the
remaining land-use consists of underutilized commercial and industrial
loft structures (Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1977).
Despite its array of parking lots, weeds, and piles of gravel, the Fort
Point Channel is considered to be an area of enormous potential (Boston
Redevelopment Authority, 1977). The City has recognized that this area
is in need of considerable revitalization, and has announced plans to
rezone and create a master plan for the Fort Point Channel and South
Boston waterfront (Boston Globe, January, 24, 1988). BRA director,
Steven Coyle, suggests that the Fort Point Channel area is the city's most
vital development frontier, and an area that will be the Government
Center of the 1990s (Boston Tab, Januarty 26, 1988). State and local
plans for major, public infrastructure improvements such as the
construction of the Third Harbor Tunnel, the Seaport Access Road,
improvements to the Northern Avenue Bridge, and repaving of roads
also exist, and an extension of the Red Line to Northern Avenue is under
consideration. Most important, this area is blessed with close proximity
to Boston's financial district. The Fan Piers Development, for instance,
would be within walking distance and visibly accessible to financial and
corporate towers that now characterize downtown Boston.
These renewed local planning efforts, state-initiated infrastructure
improvements, the proximity to downtown, and the lack of available
land elsewhere in the city have sparked developers' interest in the Fort
Point Channel area. A number of development firms have been buying
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up large parcels of land and positioning themselves for future
development in the area (Boston Globe, January 24, 1988). The upbeat
outlook for the Fort Point Channel is summarized by one forward-
looking developer who has noted: "If things fall right, this could become
the toniest area of the city in 15 years." (Boston Globe, March 24, 1987).
The Fan Piers Site: 1960-1985
One person, who appears to have spotted the area's potential early on, is
Anthony Athanas. In 1960, Athanas, an Albanian immigrant, bought
three acres of what is now Pier Four. By 1972, he had added an
additional 35 acres of land to his initial purchase. Athanas built a
restaurant on the Pier Four site and used another large portion of the
land as a parking lot. Today, the 35-acre Fan Pier/Pier Four site is the
largest, single, vacant parcel of land in the City of Boston.
In 1981, the Athanas' owned Boston Mariner Company and its joint-
venture partners, HBC Associates, presented a plan for mixed-use
development on the site to the BRA. The plan had little relation to the
existing street grid and was ringed by tall buildings at the harbor's
edge. The development team abandoned this master plan after it met
with considerable criticism from the public and the BRA.
Soon afterwards, a new architect was chosen for the site. Considerable
planning went into the new development proposals and the developers
did not present another Master Plan until 1985. The new plan consisted
of uses similar to those in the original plan, but the design was altered
to encourage more active use of the waterfront. The initial response
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from the public was positive, kicking off the project's development
review. The past three years have been characterized by extensive
negotiations as the development teams, city and state agencies, and
citizen groups try to redefine the Fan Piers proposal into a project that
is acceptable to all.
The Fan Piers Proposal Today: Costs and Benefits
Today, "the Fan Pier Development is viewed by many as the flagship
operation that would lead the way and serve as a catalyst for
development" (Boston Globe, January 24, 1988) in the entire Fort Point
Channel area. It is expected to provide a number of benefits to the city
of Boston, including 17.6 million dollars in annual real estate taxes
(Allen, April 23, 1987) and approximately 10,000 permanent jobs. The
project is expected to provide 3400 person years of construction jobs,
half of which the developer has guaranteed will go to Boston residents,
and one-fourth of which, will go to minority residents (BRA Board
Public Hearing, March 24, 1987). The developers also propose to build
1000 residential units as part of the mixed-use development.
The developers have also agreed to provide a number of additional
benefits to the City in the areas of housing, employment, and cultural
facilities (Appendix B). Given the enormous scale of the project,
approximately 15 million dollars in housing linkage funds will be
generated by the project. Part of these funds will be used to create
120 to 150 affordable housing units on a nearby off-site location (BRA
Board Public Hearing, March 24, 1987). Another 100 units of affordable
housing will be included on-site. The developers have also agreed to
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commit two million dollars to a fund for South Boston home
improvement loans and another 20,000 dollars towards a study of
methods for creating artist housing in the area (BRA Board Public
Hearing, March 24, 1987). With regard to employment benefits, the
developers will contribute an additional 3 million dollars to a job-
training fund as required by development impact project linkage
regulations (Allen, April 23, 1987). Finally, the developers will pay
between 146,000 and 200,000 dollars (figures vary) in voluntary funds
for a special job clearance office in South Boston (Boston Globe, April 23,
1987). This South Boston Job Stop program (Allen, April 23, 1987) is
part of a larger plan of the Mayors Office of Jobs and Community
Services to train and link community residents with new jobs available
due to new downtown construction (Boston Globe, April 23, 1987).
A proposed public cultural facility for the Fan Pier Development is
another possible benefit of this project. Massachusetts governor,
Michael Dukakis and senate president, William Bulger, hope that a 23
million dollar home for the Institute of Contemporary Art, containing
two theaters and several galleries, will be built on a portion of the Fan
Pier site. Media reports suggest, however, that the State planned much
of the cultural facility without consulting local officials, and that Mayor
Flynn envisions a park or more affordable housing on that portion of
the site (Boston Globe October 15, 1987). Both the Mayor and the BRA
prefer to see a cultural center in Boston's newly-created Midtown
Cultural District.
The Fan Piers Development is unique, both in its scale and its 25
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million dollars of proposed benefits. Most observers agree that "In the
pier area and in the Fort Point Channel area in general, there hasn't
been such a natural site for a public-private tug of war since the New
Boston was conjured up in the late fifties, primarily because there has
not been a chance for urban planners and developers to work at such a
grand scale."(Boston Globe, March 9, 1986). Boston is torn over
whether the public benefits of 18 million dollars in tax revenues, 3400
construction jobs, 10,000 permanent jobs, 15 million dollars in housing
linkage funds, 3 million dollars in employment training linkage funds
and a public cultural facility, can indeed offset the traffic, housing , and
design problems that will be created by this massive development
(Boston Globe, March 25, 1987). A number of observers contend that
the project's monetary benefits will not offset the public funding that
will be necessary to provide public facilities for the project (Boston
Globe March 25, 1987), while others see the the 5 million square foot
development project as a tremendous opportunity for the City. These
differences of opinion have plagued the project since the begging. The
different parties who have participated in the Fan Piers Development
review and their respective interests in the project are described below.
Political Context
A wide variety of government agencies, citizen groups, private interests
and politicians have been involved in the three year tug of war over the
Fan Piers Development. Government agencies and the officially-
designated citizen advisory committee have had a formal role in the
process, while coalitions have emerged informally as individuals and
organizations rallied around particular issues. These informal coalitions
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can broadly be divided into two groups: the construction industry, local
businesses, and neighboring commercial developments, who generally
favor the project; and housing and arts activists, environmental
groups, and other port activities, who generally oppose the project.
Finally, Mayor Flynn and, to a lesser extent, Governor Dukakis and
State Senate President Bulger have also played a role in the review of
this project.
Governmental Players
Any development project the size, scale, and complexity of the Fan
Piers Development is subject to the approval of a wide number of local
and state agencies before it is granted a building permit. This case is no
exception. Agencies officially participating in the development review
of the Fan Pier include: the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA),
Boston Office of Arts and Humanities, the Mayor's Office of Jobs and
Community Services, the Mayor's Committee on Handicapped Affairs,
the Boston Transportation Department, the Public Facilities Department,
Logan Airport officials, the Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority
(MBTA), the state Department of Environmental Quality and Engineering
(DEQE) and the state Department of Transportation (DOT). Among these,
however, the BRA has emerged as the most pivotal agency within the
development review process.
Much of Boston's growth and change over the past three decades has
been related to the activities of one agency, the BRA. The BRA was
created in the late 1950s to order to undertake the urban renewal of
Boston's blighted downtown. Today, the BRA's role is twofold. As the
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city's planning agency, its goal is to improve the social, economic, and
environmental welfare of the city as a whole. As a redevelopment
agency, it brokers virtually all large-scale development projects in the
city. It is in this latter role, that the BRA is most comfortable.
The BRA is an increasingly powerful player in the Boston's development
arena due to its growing independence within the municipal
governmental structure and its active role in negotiations with
developers. Although the Mayor can appoint the BRA's director as well
as one member of the BRA board, the agency is essentially autonomous.
In 1987, the BRA became financially independent of the City budget
which further enhanced its bargaining power in the development
review process, The BRA also negotiates --the planning guidelines for
almost all Boston development projects because the current zoning,
dating back to the sixties allows very little that can be done as of right
and still be economically feasible.
The BRA's role as a development broker has come under criticism from
all sectors. Developers often criticize the BRA's negotiating process for
its lack of formalized rules and an underlying plan, while
neighborhoods, architectural critics, and environmentalists have blamed
the BRA's ad hoc approach - for allowing large, unsightly structures to
dominate Boston's skyline. Under the leadership of a new director,
Steven Coyle, the BRA has been trying to change its image as an all-
powerful, development broker that knows no limits. The agency has
begun to create some new procedures for development review, planning
districts and citizen advisory committees to help review large scale
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development projects.
For the BRA, the highly visible Fan Pier development review is a means
of establishing some important precedents for future developers. The
agency does not want to be perceived as favoring developers or being
ad hoc in its review procedures, but it still desires to retain a
considerable degree of control over the process. In the process of
solidifying its control, the BRA wishes to avoid scaring off the
development community, on whom it relies for its funds and existence.
At the same time, it is also facing increasing pressure from both the
mayor and the community to be more responsive to citizen groups. The
Fan Piers Development requires the BRA to maneuver very carefully if
it is to achieve all of its goals.
Citizen Groups
Two citizen groups, appointed by the Mayor, are also formally involved
in the development review process. These are the Citizens Advisory
Committee (CAC), which was specifically created to review the Fan Piers
Development, and the Harborpark Plan Advisory Committee, a group
involved in the planning and development review of Boston's
harborfront land. Both of these committees, particularly the former,
have engaged in extensive negotiations with the Fan Pier developers
over the past three years.
The CAC was created in August of 1984 and is comprised of members of
most of South Boston's leading civic associations and representatives of
special interest groups (Appendix C). Lawrence Dwyer, the Director of
43
Boston Community Schools and a South Boston resident, was appointed
by the Mayor as chairman of the committee. The CAC's original eleven
members include representatives of South Boston's artist community, a
number of harbor and shipping associations, the chamber of commerce,
members of the Harborpark Advisory Group and the leaders of South
Boston neighborhood groups. A number of new members have also
been added since the CAC's creation in 1984.
Like the CAC, the HPAC is a heterogeneous group, composed of a variety
of interest groups from the Boston community. The HPAC was created
in 1985 and has overseen the creation of Harborpark design guidelines
and interim zoning standards for Boston's waterfront. The HPAC has
fifteen members--five government representatives, one representative
from each of five waterfront neighborhoods (including South Boston)
and five representatives from private and non-profit organizations with
an interest in waterfront and harbor issues. This committee's scope is
geographically broader and more planning-oriented than that of the
CAC
These two citizen committees have met on a regular basis with the
developers. The CAC, in particular, has negotiated considerably with the
developers and is generally less hostile and more well-informed of
project details than other interest groups. Both the CAC and the HPAC
have cautiously endorsed the Fan Pier Development, but have
consistently asked for further refinement and more detail on issues of
design and traffic. The CAC's primary concern is traffic congestion,
both during the construction period and in the long run. HPAC's main
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focus is the design of the site. HPAC hopes to ensure that there is
adequate public access and pedestrian comfort in the area which will
eventually become a new link in Boston's rapidly evolving Harborwalk
Park. HPAC has also noted that it would like to see the site 's scale
reduced by 25 to 30 percent so that it would be more compatible with
Harborpark design guidelines (Comment Letters for the Draft
Environmental Impact Report, 1987).
Favorable Coalitions
The Construction Industry
Among the informal coalitions, business and construction interests have
responded most favorably to the proposed Fan Pier Development. The
construction industry has emerged as the coalition most clearly in favor
of the project. Such groups as the Boston Building Trades, the Building
and Construction Trades Council of the Metropolitan District, the
Carpenters' Union, and the Plasterers' Union could be included in this
coalition. Members of the construction coalition point out that the 3400
manpower years of labor generated by the Fan Pier proposal would not
only boost the construction industry but would also stimulate further
economic development in the area. . Many construction laborers reside
in the South Boston neighborhood, however, thus while expressing
enthusiastic support for the project, these groups would also like to see
more traffic mitigation measures for the area..
Business Interests
Businessmen and trade councils see the Fan Pier Development as an
opportunity for extended retail participation and market growth of the
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City. One such group, the Alliance for The Fan Pier Project, is composed
of business, labor, and civic leaders who back the development based on
its provision of jobs, housing, tax revenues, and convention space to the
City (Boston Globe, April 11, 87, p. 22) Groups such as the South
Boston Port of Trade, which represents merchants and local businesses
in the area, AC Cruise Line, the adjacent World Trade Center, Boston
Harbor Associates, and the Children's Museum have also supported the
project (BRA Board Public Hearing, March 24, 1987) in light of the
additional clientele it will generate for their organizations.
Neighboring Commercial Developments
The commercial neighbors of the Fan Pier presently find themselves in
a somewhat awkward position of both favoring the project, but also
lobbying strongly for certain design and transportation changes. On the
one hand, neighbors such as the World Trade Center and the Boston
Wharf Company support development because the construction of the
Fan Pier will set an important precedent for development in the area
and will generate a sufficiently large employee and resident base to
support projects on adjacent sites. On the other hand, the site's
neighbors are concerned that excessively large project will result in
overly congested roads and a depleted infrastructure system, severely
hampering their own developments. And, while they like the idea that
the density of the Fan Pier will set a yardstick by which subsequent
developments can be measured, they are also concerned that the large
Fan Pier Towers may obstruct their valuable views of the Boston
skyline (Comment Letters for the Draft Environmental Impact Report,
1986).
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Opposition Coalitions
Housing and Arts Advocates
The Fan Pier Development has met with more resistance from
affordable housing and environmental groups. Numerous housing
groups and arts organizations, including the Massachusetts Tenant
Organization, The Boston Linkage Action Coalition, Massachusetts Fair
Share, Fort Point Channel Arts Community, and Friends of Boston Art,
have expressed displeasure with the proposed project. Housing
advocates have argued that the luxury residential units and hotels of
the Fan Piers and the influx of new workers will indirectly push up
housing prices in the area. These groups argue that insufficient
affordable housing has been provided by the project's developers and in
some cases are seeking as much as 50% on-site affordable housing (BRA
Board Public Hearing, March 24, 1987). The arts community is
particularly concerned that young, struggling artists who reside in the
nearby warehouses will be displaced by rising rents and gentrification
in the area. One exception within the Arts community is the Institute of
Contemporary Art which supports the project. The Fan Pier Developers
have seriously considered Kitty Dukakis' (the Governor's wife) proposal
to build a public arts facility for the Institute of Contemporary Art on
the site.
Environmental Groups
Watchdog groups such as the Massachusetts Audobon Society, Sierra
Club , the Conservation Law Foundation and the Boston Preservation
Alliance also oppose the project and charge that the Fort Point Channel
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area's infrastructure--including roads, public transit facilities, water and
sewer systems--cannot handle such a massive development as the Fan
Piers (Boston Tab January 26, 1988). The environmental groups have
noted that all of the development's traffic plans to date are dependent
on traffic improvements which have yet to be completed, such as the
construction of the Third Harbor Tunnel and the Seaport Access Road
(BRA Board Public Hearing, March 24, 1987 p. 140). They seek more
specific commitments on traffic mitigations and have requested that the
project be conditioned upon such contingencies as new tunnel
construction actually occurring.
The environmental groups criticize the City as much as the development
project itself. John Lewis of the Sierra Club notes that there is a need
for the city fo provide a complete overview of planned developments
throughout Boston in order to make traffic and construction planning
possible (Boston Tab, January 26, 1988, p. 14). Hamilton of the
Conservation Law Foundation also places an emphasis on the need for
more comprehensive planning. He notes that "places must be identified
where the city can absorb further construction before such massive
development is allowed to continue" (Boston Tab January 26, 1988).
Other Port Activities
A number of ports and harbor-oriented groups have also expressed
concerns about the impact of the proposed development on waterfront
character. Groups such as the Boston Shipping Association and the New
England Seafood Center emphasize that Boston's harbor has
traditionally been the City's lifeline. They suggest that Boston needs to
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re-evaluate the rapid transformation which the waterfront is
experiencing from a place of warehouses, fishing and trade enterprises,
and major port activities to a high-income enclave of hotels, convention
centers and luxury condominiums.. These port groups would like to see
more focus on the maritime future of the city, blue-collar worker
activities, and the import/export port activities which have traditionally
been a source of Boston's waterfront growth. Harborside, maritime
businesses are also concerned about the negative impact that traffic
congestion and hence, reduced access to the sea ports will have on their
businesses and the life of the harbor (BRA Board Public Hearing, March
24, 1987). Interestingly enough, the concerns of the harborfront
coalitions have received much less attention from the press than those
.of environmental and housing advocates.
Politicians
The Mayor
Mayor Flynn stands in the midst of these political interest groups who
are vying for a say in the Fan Pier tug of war. He must seek to balance
both the welfare of the city as a whole and the individual needs of its
various neighborhoods. In the Fan Pier case, Flynn finds himself caught
between a rock and a hard place: the fiscal and economic benefits to
the City are enormous, but the environmental and social costs have also
met with vociferous citizen criticism. A number of observers have
noted that the Mayor would tind it hard to turn down the housing and
jobs benefits as well as enormous tax revenues which a project of this
scale could offer to the City. Michael Goldman, a Boston political
consultant has commented, for instance that the enormous political
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pressure which has supported the project could only be stopped if Flynn
could make the case that the impacts would be devastating to Boston's
quality of life (Boston Globe, March 25, 1987). From other quarters,
however, there has been a steady flow of criticism of the project
Boston's strong-armed housing groups, many residents, and a number
of environmental organizations are concerned with the traffic impacts
and the inordinate scale of the project. These groups have become an
increasingly sophisticated, vocal, and powerful force in local
development politics over the past few years (Susskind et al., 1986, p.
6). The Mayor is highly aware of the citizens' and housing activists
influence, as it was these same groups that brought him to power in
1983 when he campaigned as the neighborhood mayor who would seek
to ensure that downtown's wealth was shared with the community.
(Boston Globe April 7, 1987).
The Mayor has a political self-interest in maintaining his constituents
happy and thus, supportive of him. But, with the labor unions and
developers vociferously favoring the project on the one hand, and
groups such as Massachusetts Fair Share and Massachusetts Tenants
Organizations opposing it on the other, the Mayor has found his old
coalition split right down the middle (Boston Globe, March 25, 1987).
The short term costs, and long term benefits of this development project
are another consideration for the Mayor. The costs and construction of
the development project would manifest themselves early in the
projects, while the Mayor was still in office. The benefits, however, are
long term and may not be readily apparent for a number of years, long
after the Mayor is gone. In his own political self-interest, the Mayor's
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goal is to make present conditions as positive as possible.
Although the Mayor's official approval only comes at the end of the
development review process, he has had an indirect role and very
strong influence on the proceedings throughout the development review
(Warner, 1987). During the first two years of development review, the
Mayor appeared to be supportive of the Fan Pier Development. But, he
has also approached the project cautiously, particularly since it is
located in South Boston, his own neighborhood and political base (Boston
Globe, March 25, 1987). In 1987, he surprised many observers when
he sharply criticized the project and made hardline transportation and
design demands. Others, however, were not so surprised: an avid
follower of opinion polls, the Mayor has a record of reversing his
position on large development projects following sustained criticism
(Boston Globe, October 23, 1987).
The Governor and the Senate Leader
Two state politicians have also been involved to some extent in the Fan
Pier Development review: Massachusetts Governor Dukakis and State
Senate President Bulger. Governor Dukakis' involvement has been
primarily through his control over the Departments of Environmental
Quality and Transportation, which have been highly supportive of the
project throughout the review period. The State's obvious desire to see
the project completed, combined with the Governor's national
presidential campaign, have at times placed the Governor at the mercy
of City leaders who hope to obtain as much State fiscal support as
possible. Dukakis' desire to minimize public squabbling and political
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controversy during his national campaign suggest that the State will go
along quietly with any hardline demands that the City makes.
Senator Bulger, who controls state legislation and funding, has a played
a very different role in the review process. The outspoken senator and
Mayor Flynn, both native sons of South Boston, have been locked in a
series of antagonistic and well-publicized battles over the past few
years including disputes over a solid waste energy cogeneration plant,
the Boston Garden/North Station renovation plans, and the Fan Pier
Development. Senator Bulger is also very friendly with Anthony
Athanas, whose Pier Four restaurant is a popular location for political
fundraisers and dinner. Unlike the Mayor, the Senator strongly
supports the Fan Pier Development, and the public arts facility in
particular.
Conclusions
The Fan Piers' prime location within minutes of the downtown and its
close proximity to the close-knit, politically savy South Boston
neighborhood have played an influential role in the development
review of this project. The Fan Piers Development is a large and
complex project which will provide the City of Boston and the South
Boston neighborhood with enormous housing and economic benefits, but
it will also have a number of traffic and environmental costs. Over the
past three years, numerous parties have provided the developers with
their criticisms and recommendations for change of the Fan Piers
Development. The lengthy and complex development review process to
which this project was subjected is described in Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DEVELOPMENT REVIEW PROCESS
This chapter seeks to document the three year period (1985-1988) of
intensive, well-publicized, and often controversial development review
of the Fan Piers Development. The chapter begins with a description of
the planning context within which this development review took place.
It then turns to three key components of the development review
process: policies, procedures, and citizen participation. The chapter
concludes with a detailed examination of the actual Fan Pier
negotiations. Four key areas of negotiation--density, waterfront access,
traffic impacts, and affordable housing--are explored in order to
provide a better understanding of Boston's . development review process
for large-scale projects. Different lessons emerge from each of these
four areas of negotiation. As the first project to undergo review under
the BRA's planned development area regulations, the Fan Pier may set
some precedents for future large-scale development reviews. A wealth
of valuable lessons for planners emerge from this case.
Boston's Planning Context
Evolution of Planning in Boston
Planning in Boston has undergone significant changes over the past six
decades. Between 1920 and 1960, Boston experienced only minimal
growth and development activity and planners had no role in
development review. In the 1960s however, the creation of the BRA
and federal policies led to a period of urban renewal during which the
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1962 master plan was created, the zoning code was substantially
revised and large developers were actively recruited by the City.
Developers continued to be welcomed with open arms throughout the
1970s and early 1980s. However, most of the City's growth and change
during this period occurred without the benefit of a formal plan. Case
by case negotiation became the norm as the BRA preferred to rely on a
strong bargaining stance rather than rigid and outdated zoning
regulations when undertaking development review. This negotiated
development review process continues to be widely-used today.
Negotiated Development Review
Proponents of this ad hoc process of negotiated development review
argue that it has brought increased flexibility and sensitivity to the
unique character of each development project to the review process.
Negotiations also allow development proposal to evolve through the
joint efforts of the city, citizens, and the developers, rather than being
rigidly pre-determined.. The BRA can point to the recently unveiled
Rhowes Wharf project, a well-planned, sensitively designed profitable
mixed-use waterfront development, as evidence that the process does
indeed work.
Nonetheless, a number of criticisms have also been levelled at this
process of negotiated development review. Some observers fear that
the lack of far-sighted, coordinated planning by the BRA will one day
cause the city to choke on its own ambition. Webb Nichols,
architectural critic for the Boston Globe, bitterly observes that: "Boston
is building projects that stand as monuments to accommodation,
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political pressure, avoidance, fear, arrogance, and the power of
money...the city allows development to enhance narrow special interests
in exchange for modest contributions to the public good" (Boston Globe,
April 22, 1987). Another concern is that the lack -of an official,
comprehensive plan has inhibited the public from scrutinizing the
agreements made between developers and the City. Finally, a number
of critics suggest that the BRA has become an all-powerful agency,
which controls development with an iron fist, giving developers little
leeway during negotiations, and extracts exorbitant concessions from
them. The Wall Street Journal recently noted, for instance that: "
Finishing a major project in Boston takes time and sheer persistence. In
Boston a lack of written rules--not an excess--make building so
frustrating. Zoning is so outdated that every large-scale project is
treated as an exception. This opens the door for what can seem like
endless reviews by the BRA and local residents" (The Wall Street
Journal, March 21, 1986, p. 24).
The City is well aware of these concerns. Shortly after Mayor Flynn
was first elected to office in 1983, he designated twelve task forces to
review City programs and policies and make recommendations for
change. The Task Forces' findings were published in 1984 in a
document entitled "Boston in Transition, A Program and Policy Analysis"
and were particularly critical of the BRA. The task force noted that
development in Boston had been quantitative and not qualitative. It
admonished the BRA for the lack of clear and well-communicated goals
for shaping development and standards for assessing development
proposals. The report also faulted the BRA for not having a clear
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process or policy for public involvement in the project review process.
Clearly, it was time for some changes in the development review
process.
Planning in Transition
New Policies
Soon after the report was published, Mayor Flynn hired a new director
for the agency, Steven Coyle in the hope of rectifying some of the
Agency's problems. Coyle also set out to steer the BRA in a new
direction that was consistent with the Mayor's policy of linking
downtown development and wealth with the City's neighborhoods.
Under Coyle, the BRA continues to rely primarily on negotiations rather
than regulations as the method for development review, however the
agency has begun to develop some formal policies and plans for the
physical growth of Boston. After years of reactive planning through case
by case negotiation, the BRA has increased its planning staff resources
and has began to concentrate on the creation of a vision for Boston's
growth and development. Neighborhood district plans and interim
planning overlay districts (IPODs) have begun to emerge on staff
drawing boards and new review procedures are also being developed.
Steven Coyle has stated that his goal is to have a future defined by
clean, simple, visible rules (Boston Business Journal, December 30,
1985).
Increased Citizen Participation
In response to increased community demands, the BRA has also begun
to allow a more active role for neighborhoods in the development
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review process. In a recent interview with the Boston Tab, BRA
Director Steven Coyle, stated his intention to take a pluralistic approach
to planning and to seek a better distribution of the benefits of
downtown development to the neighborhoods (BostonTab January 26,
1988, p. 10). Pam McDermott, a consultant to developers, notes that
such changes in the process are already apparent: in today's Boston, the
BRA board seeks to approve projects which have a lot of community
support, no opposition, and an aggressive public benefits program
(Boston Tab, January 26, 1988). Gone are the days of megaprojects that
provided jobs and taxes, but not much else, to the City's neighborhoods.
Today, Boston's developers know that they must approach residents at
an early stage to test an idea because the balance of power is no longer
in the developer's favor (Boston Globe, January 26, 1988).
It was within this planning context, characterized by case by case
negotiations, evolving policies and procedures, and increasing citizen
participation, that the Fan Piers Development review took place. The
policy context, procedures for both the local planned development area
review and the state environmental impact review, and nature of
citizen participation for this controversial, large-scale development
project are described below.
Policy Linkages for Development Review
Policy-Making in Transition
In 1984 when the Fan Pier developers introduced their proposal for
the site, the lack of formal plans and policies, as well as standards and
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criteria, for development review was readily apparent. The BRA had
conducted a number of studies of the Fort Point Channel area ("Fort
Point Channel Planning Area Study" and "Boston Harbor--Challenges and
Opportunities for the 1980s", for example) which discussed goals such
as renovating existing buildings and increasing access to the
waterfront, but no formal development guidelines comprehensive plan
existed for the area. Policies evolved simultaneously with the review
of the Fan Piers Development, however. Many times of the plans or
policies were based on the actual developer proposals for the site.
Other times the BRA was trying to keep just one step ahead of the
development project itself. In either case, the policies were clearly in
the evolutionary phase and it was difficult for any of the parties to the
negotiations to clearly distinguish which policies were in effect and
which were not.
Types of Policies
The policies that guided the Fan Pier through this unusual period of
development review can be divided into four broad categories: 1)
formal, written policies and regulations, 2) informal policies, 3) plans for
the general area, but excluding the actual site, and 4) no apparent
existing plans.
Formal Policies
The development review of the Fan Pier was characterized by a general
lack of formal, written policies to guide decisionmakers in their review
of the project. The only written regulation for the four issues discussed
later in this concerned affordable housing linkage payments. In 1986,
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the BRA established a Development Impact overlay district citywide
that required every new project over 100,000 square feet in size to
contribute $5.00 for every square foot over 100,000 square feet to a
Neighborhood Housing Trust Fund. These linkage requirements were
incorporated into the City Code and have been exacted from a number
of large-scale developments over the past five years. The City and
developers also included specific terms of the linkage payments in their
Cooperation Agreement. The BRA wanted the linkage agreements to be
contractually, as well as legally, bound because other developers were
challenging the legality of linkage payments in court. Thus, from the
beginning, it was well-known to the Fan Pier developers, the BRA and
the CAC that the project would have to contribute over 15 million
dollars to the fund.
Informal Policies
Although there were no other written regulations for the Fan Pier, over
the years, the BRA had devised a number of informal policies which
were well-known to most developers and citizen groups who keep
abreast of development review in Boston. The inclusionary housing
requirement was a clear example of such informal policies. This
unstated, and often unenforced, policy pressured private developers to
incorporate low and moderate income dwelling units into all projects
that include market rate housing. In 1986, Mayor Flynn suggested that
a 10% inclusionary housing requirement in exchange for density
bonuses be incorporated into the zoning code, but his recommendations
were not followed up on. Today, the 10% inclusionary housing
requirement continues to have no legal basis, but this informal BRA
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policy continues to be thrust upon most large-scale projects and is
easily anticipated by developers. The Mayor's favorable stance
towards affordable housing and downtown-neighborhood linkage also
suggests that other informal housing policies were emerging regarding
the designation of affordable housing for special groups such as the
elderly, neighborhood residents, or minorities.
Another set of informal BRA policies can be found in a document known
as "Downtown Guidelines and Growth Policies for Central Boston (1985-
96)". While not a part of the City's official planning policy, these
development guidelines were still heavily promulgated by the BRA
which made it a point to hand out copies to prospective developers.
This document included such informal policies as the BRA's broad
planning goals of channeling the direction and impact of new growth
away from downtown and into adjacent vacant and underutilized areas
surrounding North and South Stations and along the Charlestown Naval
Yard and Northern Avenue in the Fort Point Channel quarter.
Plans for the Surrounding Area
The third type of policy context for the Fan Pier concerned the existence
of a plan and policies for the surrounding area, but not for Fan Pier site
itself. The clearest example of such "selective plans" were the
Harborpark Guidelines, which later were converted into an interim
planning overlay district (IPOD). The Harborpark guidelines and IPOD
were designed to provide all parties with a shared vision of what
constituted acceptable land-uses, densities, and public access for
Boston's waterfront. Although the original Harborpark planning area
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included all waterfront properties extending from Charlestown to South
Boston, the Fan Pier was designated a special study area in the final
official IPOD, and thus exempt from the planning district's policies and
regulations.
Land-use, height, and density standards were also established in the
Boston zoning code for the surrounding Fort Point Channel properties.
Most of the properties in this area were zoned for waterfront industry
(W-2), general industry (1-2) or light manufacturing (M-1, M-2, M-4,
M-8), with an average FAR of two and no height restrictions. The Fort
Point Channel area is characterized by numerous vacant lots, two to five
story warehouse industrial structures, and a few buildings 70 to 90 feet
high. The Fan Pier's master plan planned development area (MPDA)
designation, however, exempts it from the zoning regulations applicable
to the remaining Fort Point Channel area.
Non-existent Policies
For many of the issues, such as traffic and environmental impacts there
simply were no existing policy guidelines for the Fan Piers or Fort Point
Channel area. The developers and citizen groups could look to past
cases in order to get a sense of what might be required, but knew that
in the course of the negotiations standards and criteria could easily
change. This was particularly true for the Fan Piers Development,
because in this area of the city, general traffic policies were often
highly dependent on the State's transportation agenda for
improvements of roadways such as the Central Artery and the Seaport
Access Road.
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In summary, the policy context for the development review of the Fan
Piers was in a state of flux. Formal and informal policies existed in
some areas, but not others. Furthermore, policies were being
formulated simultaneously with the development review of the project
itself. Eventually, some of these policies served as a framework for the
negotiations while others did not.
Procedural Guidelines for Development Review
The developers of the Fan Piers calculated that a total of 27 different
approvals had to be obtained from various federal, state, and local
government agencies in order to break ground for their mixed-use
project. Two of the most critical review processes were the local
planned development area review and the state environmental impact
review (Figure 4).
Local Planned Development Area (PDA) Review
In order to develop a mixed-use megaproject on the Fan Piers site,
which was zoned W-2 for waterfront industrial uses, the developers
required a Planned Development Area (PDA) special zoning designation
(Appendix D). PDA designation allows a developer to obtain zoning
exceptions without proving hardship. In exchange for this added
flexibility, the PDA zoning process requires that a master plan and/or
development plan be created for the site, and that each and every plan
of the proposed development be subject to full BRA design and
development review.
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During the early 1980s, Boston processed close to two dozen PDA
zoning requests for sites between one and five acres. Sites greater than
five acres, however, require a Master Plan PDA, a zoning designation
that requires the creation of a master plan in addition to the PDA
development plan. The Fan Pier Development was the first proposal to
ever apply for Master Plan PDA status and, thus it was in many ways a
guinea pig for the review process. Both the development community
and city officials were keenly aware that this series of negotiations
would set a precedent for future Master Plan PDA reviews in the
Boston. Throughout the remainder of this thesis the Master Plan PDA
process shall be referred to simply as the PDA process.
A project applying for Master Plan PDA approval must submit to three
major phases of development review: planned development area
designation, review of the development plan , and BRA design review.
All three phases require the submittal of physical plans and project
documentation, extensive BRA and public review, and public hearings
before either the Zoning Commission or the Board of Appeals. The Fan
Pier Development completed the first two phases of the process--PDA
designation and the submittal of the development plan--, which are
unique to the PDA review process. According to the BRA, these PDA
procedures must be completed before development rights are vested
and construction can begin (Boston Redevelopment Authority, Zoning
Procedures for Master Plan/Planned Development Areas, 1985). The
key steps of these two phases of development review for the Fan Piers
are outlined below.
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FIGURE 4. Chronology of the Fan Piers Development Review Process
985 Draft environmental ~impact' report submittedApproved in early February.
earing
1986 BRA Board approves master plan and
recommends PDA designation
Cooperation Agreements drafted.
7earing
1986 Zoning commission approves zoning map
ammendments designating PDAs #23 & 24
Developers submit development plans.
1986 Final environmental impact report is submitted.
JA R. BRA staff review development plans.
S:] Secretary Hoyt accepts FEIR, but requests
additional mitigation plans (Feb.)
earing
1987 Revised development plans submitted.BRA Board public hearing held.
Cooperation agreements amended.
9 7BRA board approves development plans.
Mayor Flynn calls for State commitments to
E 8traffic improvements for project to proceed.
Mayor and BRA director demand a reduction in
building heights.
988 Fan Piers owner and developers take one
another to court.
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Phase I. PDA Designation
During the first phase of the PDA review process the developers sought
designations of the sites as master plan planned development areas.
According to the BRA's development review procedures- the developers
had to submit an application for PDA designation together with a master
plan for the site. The development team consulted with the BRA,
abutters, and various community organizations for their response to the
proposal. Based on these public hearings and BRA criteria, the BRA staff
then submitted its own analysis and recommendations to the BRA
Board.
On February 12, 1986, following a prior public hearing, the BRA Board
approved the Fan Pier developers' master plan for the two sites. This
signified tentative approval of the development concept, land-uses and
density allowances for the site (March 20, 1986 Cooperation Agreement,
1986). Cooperation Agreements, which addressed employment and
traffic access plans, were signed at this time. The staff also began to
draft exaction agreements for Development Impact Projects with the
developer. These exaction agreements addressed housing and job
linkage payments required by City law of all Development Impact
Projects (DIPs), office developments exceeding 100,000 square feet. A
little more than a month later, on March 21, 1986, the Boston Zoning
Commission held a public hearing and voted to approve map
amendments to the Boston zoning code, which designated the sites as
PDAs 23 and 24. Shortly thereafter, the Mayor approved the master
plans and PDA designations for the sites.
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Because the Fan Pier Development was the test case for the PDA review
process, no past cases could be looked to for guidance which left a
number of the regulations and steps in the review process open to
various interpretations. One such conflict of interpretations involved
the role of the master plan. All parties agreed that the master plan
approval and PDA designation established a general development
concept that locked in density and usage restrictions for the properties,
but did not address issues such as specific design considerations,
housing, and transportation (Boston Globe, March 15, 1987). The
development team held, however, that once the master plan was
approved, it signalled subsequent BRA approval for all development
components as long as these were consistent with the master plan. BRA
director Steven Coyle disagreed, noting that master plan approval did
not signify approval of a specific development concept. According to
Coyle, the master plan simply allowed general conceptual approval of
changes in land-use and density, but did not constitute approval of
building footprints, mass, heights and dimensions (Boston Globe,
February 4, 1986). Eventually, the developers reluctantly accepted
Coyle's interpretation.
Phase II: The Development Plan
During the second phase of the Master Plan PDA review, the
development plans for the two adjacent sites were submitted to the
BRA (November, 1986). Over the course of the next four months,
BRA staff members reviewed the development plans and suggested
revisions. Meanwhile, the developer, government officials and CAC
worked out a series of additional benefits packages regarding jobs and
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procurement, public access to the waterfront, transportation mitigations
and affordable housing to be provided by the developers of the Fan
Piers Project. These were incorporated into the development plan or as
amendments to the Cooperation Agreements. These amendments were
revised in late March due to concerns of the CAC which are described
later in this thesis.
In March of 1987, the revised development plans were submitted for
BRA Board approval. These development plans documented the location
and appearance of structures and open space, the proposed uses and
densities for the site, traffic circulation, parking and loading facilities,
and the dimensions of the structures, including footprints and heights
(Allen, April 23, 1987, p1). The BRA Board public hearing on the
development plans for the PDAs was held on March 24, 1987. A month
later, on April 23, 1987, the Board unanimously approved the project
allowing it to move into the final phase of the BRA's development and
design review process (Boston Globe, April 11,1987).
Recent Events in the Fan Piers Review Process
The April 1987 approval of the development plan signalled BRA
tentative approval of the Fan Pier Planned Development Area . The
project then disappeared from public view until October of 1987, when
Mayor Flynn suddenly called for significant design changes and a major
commitment by the State towards putlic transportation facilities before
the Fan Piers Development would be allowed to continue (Boston Globe,
January 20, 1988). A few months later, in January of 1988, after six
years of increasingly tense private negotiations, the partnership
67
between HBC Associates and the Boston Mariner Corporation fell apart
as the developers filed double lawsuits against each other. Each party
charged that the other had held up the project and development review
process, jeopardizing the project and making the agreed-upon December
1988 groundbreaking date impossible.
Today, the Fan Piers Development still lacks several design and
environmental approvals. The project must also still go through the
standard BRA design review process that most Boston projects are
subjected to. During this third phase, the BRA and Inspectional
Services Department (ISD) will review the development concept,
schematic design, final design and contract documents (Boston
Redevelopment Authority, Development Review Procedures, 1986) of
the proposed development according to selected design, environmental,
and socio-economic criteria. These final designs must be consistent with
the limitations and provisions established in the Development Plan.
Once the project has been approved by the BRA, the developers must
petition the Board of Appeals for a zoning exception. Meanwhile, the
Fan Pier portion of the development has been stalled as the developers
sue one another in court and the outlook for the projects does not
appear promising. William Whelan, of the Boston development firm
Spaulding and Sly Co. has noted that: "The odds of this fight being
peacefully resolved are virtually non-existent" (Boston Globe January,
20, 1988).
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State Environmental Impact Review
The state environmental impact review took place simultaneously with
Boston's PDA review, often providing valuable studies and information
to the local decisionmakers responsible for PDA approvals. Unlike the
new PDA review process, the EIR procedures were clearly laid out by
the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Agency (MEPA) and had
been applied tp a large number of cases prior to the Fan Piers proposal.
The Environmental Review Process required the developers to submit a
draft environmental impact report (DEIR) describing the probable
impacts of the projects and proposed mitigation measures. The firm of
Skidmore, Owings and Merrill was hired by the developer for this task
and the DEIR was submitted in December of 1985. Citizens, government
agencies, and other interested groups were given 30 days to review the
DEIR and provide written comments to the Secretary of Environmental
Affairs. The Secretary of Environmental Affairs, Hoyt, upon reviewing
this document, issued a certificate of completion. In it he praised the
DEIR as a "truly useful planning document" and a "high quality piece of
work, which is extensive in breadth and provides creative and
thoughtful mitigation measures" (January 30, 1986 Certificate of the
Secretary of Environmental Affair on the DEIR, 1986). There were also
a number of criticisms and concerns regarding the proposed project,
which are described later in this chapter.
In November of 1986, the consultants completed the Final
Environmental Impact Report (FEIR) which sought to incorporate or
respond to many of the comments issued following the DEIR. Again, a
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30 day review period allowed concerned individuals and groups to
provide their input to the Secretary. The BRA, the CAC, and the HPAC
met weekly to review the environmental impacts and mitigation
measures proposed in the FEIR. At the request of both the CAC and the
BRA, the deadline for submitting comments on the FEIR was extended
twice. In February, 1987 Hoyt issued a Certificate of Adequacy for the
Fan Piers Development. However, he made the unusual move of
requesting that the developer provide initial mitigation analyses and
measures in five key areas: transportation, infrastructure (water
supply, sewage, utility lines), public waterfront access, visual impacts,
and public benefits. Today, these mitigation plans are still incomplete.
In summary, the Fan Piers Development was subjected two major
development review processes--the local PDA review and the state EIR
review. Both processes established a set of procedures included an
assessment of project costs and benefits, mitigation measures and public
opinion. The local PDA review, however, was a new and untested
process with a number of different procedural interpretations, while the
state EIR process had been used for a number of years for projects
across the state and was fairly predictable.
Citizen Participation in the Development Review Process
Throughout the three year review process, the CAC worked closely with
both the BRA and the developers, and was actively involved in both the
local negotiations and the state EIR process. From the beginning, the
members of the CAC sensed that the City intended to allow the Fan Piers
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Development to be built. Hence, they focused not on stopping the
project but on mitigating its negative impacts and obtaining as many
benefits as possible for the community (Butler, April 25, 1988). The
CAC members were dedicated to their work and diligently reviewed all
proposals, studies and relevant documentation on the Fan Piers
Development. Within a year, the committee had acquired considerable
credibility and was assuming an increasingly active role in the process.
The developers held over 200 meetings with the community, public
agencies, and various interest groups, including 70 that were open to
the general public (BRA Board Public Hearing, March 24, 1987). At the
peak of activity, CAC meetings were held as often as twice a week and
could last up to five or six hours. Typically, the developers sent the CAC
their proposals and plans before a meeting so that the members could
review them. More often than not, the committee put the proposal
under a microscope and scrutinized its every detail (Butler, April 25,
1988). Then, at the meetings, members asked the developers or the BRA
questions and expressed their objections and recommendations for the
project. As these meetings were open to the public, other non-CAC
members often participated in the discussions as well. The developers
were usually cooperative, but sometimes the discussions over exactions
turned heated. There was a general sense among members of both the
BRA and the development community that the CAC was overstepping its
bounds, but once its members became heavily involved in the
development review process, little room was left for retreat.
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The CAC also played a role in the drafting of the cooperation
agreements which contractually bound the BRA and the developers to
the terms agreed upon in the negotiations. The BRA lawyers actually
negotiated the terminology of the Cooperation Agreements with the
development team's lawyers, but all of the drafts for these agreements
were sent to the CAC for comments and desired revisions.
The CAC also actively pursued a broader community outreach and
information dissemination program by holding large, South Boston
meetings once every few months. These meetings were well attended.
Over 2000 people attended the first such session, and others averaged
500 or 600 people. These meetings were not only designed to provide
the community with informational updates on the Fan Pier, but also to
obtain people's feedback. Questions were fielded by CAC members, the
BRA or the developers, and the CAC often held follow-up meetings to
get back to people on the unresolved questions or issues (Butler, April
25, 1988).
The citizen participation process, like many of the policies and
procedures for the Fan Piers Development, was new and in a state of
transition. Nonetheless, the CAC committed itself whole-heartedly to
despite this time-consuming and complex development review process.
Most of its members felt that their efforts were a success: after three
years of negotiations, the CAC managed to obtain over 25 million
dollars in benefits and mitigation measures from the Fan Piers
Development. Some of the most critical benefits and mitigation
measures are described below.
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The Fan Piers Negotiations:
A project as large and as complex as the Fan Pier Development
inevitably raises wide number of sensitive issues that can become the
source of heated controversy. The Fan Pier negotiations focused on a
range of issues including sewerage, wind, air and water pollution,
changing character of the area, and pedestrian environment. Four of
the most critical issues, however were density, waterfront access,
traffic, and affordable housing. Time and time again, different
government agencies, the appointed citizen advisory committees, and
the various coalition groups found themselves returning to these four
critical issues, which are described below in order to illustrate the
complexity and controversies of this particular review process.
Density of Development and Building Heights
With twelve major buildings and close to five million square feet of
development, the Fan Pier Development is one of the largest, most
densely built projects that the City of Boston has ever had. The density
of the development and the actual heights of the buildings, particularly
the waterfront structures, were prominent issues throughout the review
process.
The overall density of development was a concern because of its direct
relationship to the demand for services and infrastructure such as
water and sewage lines and roads. Large-scale projects such as the Fan
Pier place an added burden on an already severely-stressed
73
Four Critical Issues
infrastructure network. In response to these concerns, developers'
consultants included a new, "lesser scale alternative" in the DEIR.
However, this new "lesser scale alternative" was only 2.7% smaller that
the total square footage of the initial proposal, and sought to
"accommodate the same uses and total square footage as the initial
proposal" (January 30, 1986 Certificate of the Secretary of
Environmental Affairs on the Draft Environmental Impact Report, 1986,
p. 2). Critics pointed out that this hardly appeared to be a lessening of
scale and in fact, many of the buildings appeared to be taller than in the
initial proposal (the Draft EIR did not specify actual building heights
(January 30, 1986 Certificate of the Secretary of Environmental Affairs
on the Draft Environmental Impact Report, 1986, p.2). The public
continued to express concerns about the overall density of the project.
Eventually, through negotiations, the floor-area ratio (FAR) for the sites
was reduced from 4.7 to 4.25, with the Fan Pier's office FAR capped at
2.25 and Pier Four's at 2.0 in the PDA master plans and development
plans.
Building heights were even more controversial than the density of the
development for three reasons. First, there had been a general
movement towards discouraging very tall towers in Boston in recent
years. Structures such as International Place in the financial district
had been severely criticized for being out of proportion with Boston's
historical architectural scale. Similarly, the proposed Fan Piers' building
heights significantly exceeded existing heights in the nearby Boston
Wharf district. Second, the BRA was concerned about the presence of
the Fan Pier high rise towers on the waterfront, a critical element of
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Boston's visual landscape (Figure 5). The towers would reduce views of
the downtown skyline and were out of scale with Boston's waterfront.
Steven Coyle, director of the BRA had noted that the Fan Pier tower
should not exceed the height of the landmark Custom- House Tower,
which rose 496 feet above the waterfront. The height and mass of the
two hotel buildings of the Fan Piers Development would clearly rival the
Custom House as the focus of the waterfront so the question was
whether they would overwhelm it (Boston Globe, April 24, 1987).
Third, there were concerns about the impact of the tall, high-rise
buildings on pedestrian comfort. Building height can influence on the
degree of cold, shade, and windiness felt at ground level by pedestrians
(Boston Globe, April 24, 87), particularly in Boston. These concerns led
to extensive negotiations over the heights of the proposed Fan Piers
buildings.
The negotiations between the developers and the BRA, HPAC, and CAC
resulted in height reductions for a number of the buildings. For
instance, the original development plan, which contained a total of
twelve buildings with heights exceeding 150 feet, was revised so that
finally only seven of the proposed structures in the PDA development
plan were over 150 feet in height (BRA
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FIGURE 5: Views of the Proposed Fan Piers Development from the
Water
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Board Public Hearing, March 24, 1987). One of the most criticized
structures was the 550 foot hotel tower on the Fan Pier waterfront.
Although the BRA did require that its height be reduced to
approximately 450 feet, it did not seek to detract from the landmark
stature of the hotel. The PDA development plan approved in April of
1987 specifically capped this structure at 450 feet. After the April 23,
1987 BRA Board vote to approve the development plan, BRA spokesman
Ralph Menolo noted: "There can be design changes involving the height
but it is unlikely they'd be drastic" (BG April 24, 1987).
In October, 1987, however, the developers and the public were
greeted by a surprise decision from the BRA and Mayor Flynn when the
Mayor ordered that this tallest building of the Fan Pier project be sliced
by 250 feet. The proposed 450 foot envelope of the waterside hotel
was thus, effectively reduced to a 200 foot high building (Boston Globe,
October 15, 1987). The BRA also established new design standards,
which reduced proposed building heights of 150-250 feet to only 80-
150 feet. The rationale for this sudden move was that there was a need
to reduce the shadow on public spaces as well as the windy downshifts.
The Mayor noted that he was seeking a scale of development similar to
that of Rhowes Wharf (Boston Globe, October 15, 1987).
The demand for such a drastic reduction in height surprised many as
the development had already received master plan and development
plan approval for a design that included the 450 foot waterfront hotel
tower. Coyle noted: "We didn't see that as a final approval. The
developers were merely expressing their preferences for height and
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density, not ours." (Boston Globe, October 16, 1987). Privately, member
of the Citizen Advisory Committee questioned Coyle's statements. Coyle
had written to the Secretary of Environmental Affairs, eight months
previously, that the tower needed to be between 400 and 450 feet, but
that its prominence should continue to be reinforced (Boston Globe
October 16, 1987).
The sudden change of heart with regard to building height highlighted
one of the CAC's concerns with the development review process: no
specific height standards existed for the City of Boston. Nine months
before the BRA and Mayor's surprise decision, the CAC had noted in its
commentary on the FEIR that "it is incumbent on the BRA to state their
overall development policy and master plan for the (Fort Point Channel
) area, defining such parameters as FAR, scale, density, heights and
permitted uses if the developer is to adequately respond to the
development review process" (Comment Letters for the FEIR, 1987).
The Mayor's announcement also led many observers to believe that the
project would come to a complete halt, but the developers appeared
prepared to deal with any turn of events that came their way.
Public Access to the Waterfront
During the environmental review process, it became clear that a large
number of individuals and organizations were also concerned about the
Fan Piers Development's level of invitation to the general public. With a
wall of buildings along Northern Avenue and a small number of
pedestrian walkways, the public's physical and visual access to the
waterfront were minimal. There were also concerns that the general
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public would never feel welcome in an exclusive, upper income
development such as the Fan Pier (Boston Globe, October 22, 1987). In
response to these criticisms, the designers sought to improve the site's
plan to include more useable public space. The BRA's Harborpark
design standards for waterfront development served as guidelines for
subsequent negotiations between the designers, the BRA and the CAC.
Harborpark was the result of BRA efforts in the early 1980s to create a
"planning program for balanced development and continued
revitalization of Boston's waterfront" (Kloster, 1987. p. 53). In October
of 1984, the agency released "Harborpark: A Framework for Planning",
which discussed goals and design standards to promote public access
and balanced growth of Boston's waterfront. This document also
designated a citizen committee, the HPAC, to assist in the planning and
zoning review of parcels along the waterfront. The standards and
review criteria of the Harborpark guidelines were to form the basis for
an IPOD which would stretch along Boston's waterfront from
Charlestown to South Boston. The creation of the IPOD took close to
three years, however, during which time the Harborpark design
guidelines served only as an informal policy to guide the BRA's
negotiations with waterfront developers.
In March of 1987, the Harborpark Plan finally acquired IPOD status
and became legally enforceable. The Fan Pier Development, was
designated a "special study area" and exempt from the IPOD regulations.
A number of waterfront activists criticized the IPOD for excluding such
sensitive sites as the Fan Pier and noted that such exemptions missed
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the point of the original plan which was to address the entire Boston
waterfront as a unique resource that required a unified planning
approach and a common set of development goals (Boston Globe, May
15, 1986). The BRA asserted that the Fan Pier site was subject to a
different planning process which was also addressing many of the same
waterfront access issues. At a public meeting concerning the waterfront
IPOD in June of 1986, changes were being made on the zoning document
up until the last minute. This resulted in confusion and mixed
messages from BRA director Steven Coyle, who assured the audience
that the Fan Pier fell within the height restrictions of the IPOD. Later
review of the IPOD regulations revealed that this was not the case, and
the Fan Pier was indeed exempt. Despite this exemption, the
Harborpark guidelines played an influential role in determining the
character and design of the final site plan for the Fan Piers.
Extensive negotiations took place between the BRA, the CAC, HPAC and
the developers concerning public access to the site and the waterfront.
In the final development plan, sixty percent of the site's area consisted
of publicly accessible areas including an extension of the Harborwalk
linear waterfront park, an entry court with a landscaped boulevard and
reflective pool, a large public waterfront plaza overlooking a nine acre
marina, and a public breakwater for fishing and other activities (Figures
6 and 7). The development plan design also included a dramatic,
curving canal lined with public promenades on either side and crossed
by four bridges. In response to BRA, HPAC, and CAC concerns, waterside
promenades were expanded from 15 feet in width to 27 feet in width,
and building footprints were redistributed to improve access to the
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FIGURE 7: The Fan Activities
waterfront. The final designs were considered by many to be vast
improvements over the initial 1985 master plan proposals.
Traffic Impacts
Traffic impacts were believed by many to be the most acute problem of
the proposed Fan Piers Development and were discussed extensively
throughout the review process. Residents, government agencies, and
environmental groups expressed numerous concerns regarding the
capacity of the existing roads and bridges to bear the increase in traffic
that would be generated by this large scale development. Among
critics, there was also little doubt that the area was in need of
additional public transportation facilities to accommodate the new Fan
Pier Development.
Traffic Issues in the EIR Process
The issue of traffic impacts was first addressed extensively in the Draft
Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) prepared by the consultants hired
by the Fan Pier Developers. In the DEIR,the consultants estimated that
at full-build, the Fan Pier would generate 27,420 transit trips daily
(DEIR, p. iv-1-82) and that 18,000 automobile trips a day would be
generated by the development (December 1986 Draft Environmental
Impact Report, 1986). The consultants based their analysis on the
modal split found in most downtown Boston offices, and also assumed
that only as many cars as there were legal parking spaces would travel
to the Fan Pier. The consultants concluded that frequent shuttle bus
service and area parking restrictions would attract a high percentage of
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commuters and thus, result in minimal traffic impacts by the Fan Pier
Development (Warner, 1987).
The findings of the DEIR generated considerable controversy among
state and local officials. The gap between assumptions and outcomes in
the DEIR was heavily criticized by a number of state transportation
officials (MassPort and Massachusetts Executive Office of
Transportation) for three reasons. First, a number of government
officials noted that assuming a modal split similar to that of the
downtown was unrealistic. The Fan Pier site is at least a half mile from
the closest Red Line (South Station) and Blue Line (Aquarium) stations,
and only two MBTA buses directly serve the site. Although the closest
Red Line public transit stop at South Station would be a pleasant walk
in the summertime, most of the officials noted that it was highly
unlikely that pedestrians would walk that far during the more
inhospitable weather from November through March. Second, rather
than using a demand-based model, the consultants worked backwards
from existing parking spaces to calculate the number of automobile
commuters. This approach also seemed highly unrealistic to the critics.
Third, government officials and residents were concerned because the
project and the consultant's forecasts relied heavily on future
infrastructure improvements such as the Depression of the Central
Artery, construction of a Seaport Access Road and the Third Harbor
Tunnel, and major improvements to the Northern Avenue Bridge, as
mitigation measures for transportation impacts. If, these public projects
did not come to fruition, the traffic impacts of the Fan Piers
Development would be be significant.
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Upon completion of the draft environmental impact review, the
Secretary of Environmental Affairs noted that considerable work
remained to be done on the issue of traffic impacts. He pointed out that
public transportation facilities barely exist in the vicinity of the Fan Pier
Development and the proposed Third Harbor Tunnel and Depressed
Central Artery projects were not enough to eliminate the traffic impacts
of the proposed project. The Secretary requested a more detailed
analysis of the traffic impacts and considerably more assurance of the
feasibility, funding, and timing of the proposed mitigation measures in
the Final EIR (January 30, 1986 Certificate of the Secretary of
Environmental Affairs on the Draft Environmental Impact Report, 1986,
p. 5). Furthermore, he requested more extensive consideration of the
possibilities of a public transit system and water-based transportation
in the area (January 30, 1986 Certificate of the Secretary of
Environmental Affairs on the Draft Environmental Impact Report, 1986,
p.5). In accordance with the recommendations of a number of the
participants in the environmental review process, the Secretary
suggested that reduced project density and a change in the mix of uses
also be considered as possible means of solving or mitigating the traffic
problems (January 30, 1986 Certificate of the Secretary of
Environmental Affairs on the. Draft Environmental Impact Report, 1986,,
p. 5).
In November of 1986, the Final EIR concluded that 10,000 vehicle trips
and 27,1000 public transit trips would be generated daily by the Fan
Pier Development once it had reached full-build capacity. This estimate
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was derived assuming a 70-30 modal split with public transit
accounting for 70% of all commuters to the Fan Piers Development. The
consultants concluded that strict parking regulations, shuttle bus service
and a number of measures designed to promote public transit ridership
were adequate traffic mitigation measures. The CAC and a number of
other observers continued to be skeptical about such assumptions.
Traffic Issues in the Local PDA Review Process
While the EIR process required the developers and government
authorities to assess the impacts and propose mitigation measures for
problems such as traffic, it did not have any statutory power to require
that these measures be implemented. Local level reviews, however, did
address the issue of implementing the traffic mitigation measures.
According to Ellen Watts three weeks of grueling negotiations were held
between the developers, the BRA, the Boston Transportation
Department and the CAC (Warner, 1987). Despite doubts about its
methodology and assumptions, the EIR formed the basis for these
negotiations (Warner. 1987). The negotiations took longer than
expected as the CAC's wording for some of the traffic mitigations and
developer penalties for non-compliance was unacceptable to the
developers' lawyers (Boston Globe, March 20, 1987).
By the time the Fan Pier Development was presented to the BRA Board
for development plan approval in March of 1987, a number of
negotiated agreements had been reached between the neighborhood,
City and the developers. City officials were seeking developer
guarantees that 5 million dollars in transportation-related
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improvements and services would be implemented before the
development was completed (Boston Globe, March 19, 1987). The
developers agreed to devise a transportation access plan that would
assess project traffic impacts, establish performance goals, identify
mitigations measures, and create a monitoring system. They also
agreed to annually submit for BRA approval a Supplementary Traffic
Access Plan which would update this plan on a yearly basis.
Furthermore, the developers stated that they would help establish
Boston's first Transportation Management Association, provide shuttle
bus service on an interim basis, and provide dock space for an inner
Harbor and Logan Airport water shuttle service (Allen, April 23, 1987).
The only developer funding called for was a charge of up to 50 cents a
square foot (2.9 million dollars) less the costs incurred for other transit
and car-pooling promotion measures, which would be payable if traffic
continued to exceed tolerable levels despite the mitigation measures
described above (Warner, 1987). All of these traffic mitigation
measures were incorporated as amendments into the PDA cooperation
agreements signed by the BRA and the developers.
Despite state and local assurances, the CAC continued to have concerns
about the proposed mitigation measures. So they pushed for a revised
amendment to the agreement by which the developers would delay the
last 25% of the project for up to four years if the road capacity and
public transit facilities were found to remain inadequate for the Fan
Pier traffic (Boston Globe, April 24, 1987). The development team
accepted this proposed revision. According to Steven Coyle, director of
the BRA, the final votes of approval for the project were contingent on
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the plan achieving a model split of 50% automobile users and 50%
public transit users (Boston Tab, January 26, 1988). This modal split
condition, however, was never formally incorporated into
the Cooperation Agreements.
Traffic Planning Issues
The negotiations over traffic impacts and mitigations raised some
important questions regarding the nature -of transportation planning
and policies in both the City of Boston and the State. Residents found
that few City traffic plans had been created for the South Boston/Fort
Point Channel area and that considerable uncertainty existed concerning
the timing of proposed roadway improvements. Some community
leaders suggested that more was being done to facilitate the travel to
the Fan Pier than to reduce congestion in South Boston. They noted
with irony, that little commitment had been made to the much-needed
15 million dollar Northern Avenue Bridge improvements until the Fan
Pier Development came along (Warner, 1987). In January of 1987 at a
CAC meeting, the City committed $150,000 dollars to a traffic
engineering study that would address South Boston's traffic concerns
stemming from the Fan Pier Development, Central Artery and Third
Harbor Tunnel projects (Boston Globe, January 9, 1987). The scope of
the study was determined by the CAC, South Boston residents, the City
and the State, and its goal was to consider a number of public transit
and road alternatives for the area. A South Boston Traffic Advisory
Committee, composed of government officials and concerned residents,
was also established.
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Funding for Public Transit
The state MBTA was also engaged in a number of transportation studies
for the Fort Point Channel area. In the fall of 1987, the State-sponsored
study found that the Fan Pier Development would bring an extra
17,000 commuters a day into the Fort Point Channel area (Boston Tab,
January 26, 1988) and concluded that the Central Artery would not be
sufficient to bear the extra traffic generated by the Fan Pier
Development. The study recommended that the Red Line be extended
from the existing Broadway Station to the Fan Pier waterfront area and
then rejoined at South Station in order to provide the area with better
public transit facilities (Tab, January 26, 1988). Traffic planners
further recommended that different private funding alternatives should
be considered for the public transit extension which was estimated to
cost between 250 and 500 million dollars.
Private financing mechanisms were never actively pursued by the City,
however. Despite recommendations from Boston Department of
Transportation Commissioner Richard Dimino that 5 million dollars in
developer contributions be required for traffic mitigations, the
development agreements drafted never included any Fan Pier
commitments to underwrite bus service or provide funds for a Red Line
extension (Warner, 1987). Andy McClurg of the BTD has suggested that
all parties were aware of the possible use of private financing, but the
issue was never put on the negotiating table. He suggests that one
reason for this may be because the BRA "may have been in developer
mode rather than planner mode during the negotiations" (Warner,
1987).
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Indeed, throughout the review process, the City, assumed a pro-
development stance, and suggested that the State and not the
developers, should be responsible for funding the necessary traffic
improvements. BRA director Steven Coyle, for instance, sent a letter to
Secretary of Transportation, Salvucci in December 1986 stating that the
BRA would not approve the project until the State provided a definitive,
verified schedule, cost estimates and a funding commitment for
transportation improvements that would facilitate the Fan Pier
Development" (Warner). In August of 1987, Coyle again publicly lashed
out at the the State for not taking steps to implement the improvements
promised for South Boston (Boston Globe, August 12, 1987, p. 17). In
October of 1987, around the same time that substantial changes in
project density and reduction in building heights were requested,
Mayor Flynn also threatened to torpedo the 1 billion dollar Fan Pier
Development Project unless the Red Line was reconfigured to serve the
area. Flynn noted that mass transit was necessary to accommodate the
17,000 commuters expected on a daily basis at the complex. According
to the Boston Globe, Flynn had decided that without an ultimatum there
would be not assurance that the State would take the lead in tackling
the problem of traffic in Boston's waterfront area (Boston Globe October
15, 1987).
Affordable Housing
Because of its size, the Fan Pier Development fell under Boston's
relatively new development impact projects (DIP) regulations, and thus,
the developers were required to pay $5.00 for each square foot of gross
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floor area in excess of the first 100,000 square feet to a special fund for
the construction of low and moderate income housing. This amounted
to 15.4 million dollars in housing linkage payments for the Fan Pier
developers.
According to the DIP regulations for housing linkage, the developers had
the option of constructing some affordable -housing on-site or simply
contributing money to Boston's linkage fund which the City would use to
build housing elsewhere. The developers originally proposed to shelve
the affordable housing or to have others build it off-site (BRA Board
Public Hearing, March 24, 1987, p. 22). The CAC whose major concern
was housing for the local elderly population, agreed that off-site
affordable housing was the best solution. because South Boston's
elderly had no desire to live in the exclusive Fan Piers Development
(Butler, April 25, 1988). Affordable housing groups and some state
officials, however, expressed their concern over the high degree of
homogeneity and exclusivity of the project. Local artists, who used Fort
Point Channel's warehouse lofts as cheap, roomy studios for their work,
were also concerned that they would be displaced due to pressures on
the rental market from Fan Pier residents and employees. A number of
very outspoken representatives of the local artist community began to
attend the CAC meetings and so joined city housing advocates in their
demands for affordable housing on-site.
In response to these pressures from local artists and housing advocates,
as well as the media, the BRA and the CAC called for less exclusivity and
a greater mix of residential types (Boston Globe, October 22, 1987).
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After lengthy negotiations, the developers agreed to upgrade the
housing benefit package to include 100 units of on-site affordable
housing, including family as well as elderly housing. They also agreed
to build the affordable housing units during the early phases of
construction (Boston Globe, March 11, 1987) and to give South Boston
residents first options on the affordable housing. Twenty percent of the
on-site housing units would be rental units, while the remainder would
be equity ownership (BRA Board Public Hearing, March 24, 1987). The
developers also agreed to use part of the linkage funds to build some
150 units of affordable housing on a nearby, off-site parcel. Another
forty units would be provided as artist's work and living space (BRA
Board Public Hearing, March 24, 1987). Finally, the developers agreed
to contribute 2 million dollars to a Neighborhood Stabilization Fund
which would grant low-interest loans to South Boston residents for
renovation and conservation of the existing housing stock. These
housing packages were incorporated into the PDA Cooperation
Agreements or amendments as the negotiations progressed.
A number of participants in the development review process were not
satisfied with the negotiated agreements for affordable housing. Janice
Fine, head of Boston Fair Share, criticized the agreement and pushed for
a benefits package in which at least 50% of the Fan Pier's 1000 units
would be affordable. Her proposal was not accepted. Mayor Flynn also
encouraged more affordable housing, noting that he preferred to see
more affordable residential units rather than the proposed public
cultural facility on the Fan Pier site. Most members of the CAC and the
BRA were satisfied with the negotiations, however.
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Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to summarize some of the key steps and
actions of the very unique and complex development review process for
the Fan Piers Development. Each of the four areas. -of negotiation
described in this chapter provides important lessons for Boston's
development review process. In the case of density and heights, we
find a clear example of autonomous decision-making, where the rules of
the review process were changed late in the game. The waterfront
access negotiations are an example of the success and satisfaction that
can be achieved by all parties when negotiations take place within a
clearly-stated, policy framework. The issue of traffic highlights many of
the difficulties that occur when a highly technical issue is in both the
hands of state and local authorities. Finally, the affordable housing
negotiations covered a wide range of exaction techniques including
linkage, inclusionary housing, and developer contributions.
For more than two years, the Mayor's people guided the Fan Pier
Development through a maze of regulatory and citizen review processes
(Boston Globe, October 15, 1987). When the BRA gave the project
tentative approval in April of 1987, the project was clearly on the fast
track and appeared to have unstoppable momentum. In the fall of
1987, however, the City's early enthusiasm for the project appeared to
dwindle. In October, the Fan Pier Development was dealt twin blows
when Mayor Flynn called for public transportation guarantees as a
precondition for development permission and Coyle suddenly
announced drastic height reductions of up to 250 feet for some of the
Fan Pier towers. Combined with the crash of the stock market, the
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future of the project appeared dismal at best. In January, 1988 the
developers of the two adjacent sites took each other to court suggesting
that the Fan Piers Development had indeed seen its last days.
Did the City kill this project or did it die on its own? Many observers
suggest that political motivations still drive project approvals in this
city. For instance, shortly after the Mayor's change of heart in late
1987, the Boston Globe observed the following: "Last week's mayoral
ambush of the Fan Pier is a stark reminder that the development game
isn't over until the very end...despite new layers guidelines and
commissions, development in Boston is still a game where City Hall
makes the rules and changes them at will" (Boston Globe, October 1987).
Earl Flansbugh, a Boston architect, appeared to agree, noting that the
Fan Pier review process was arbitrary and had gone well beyond the
normal design review process for a development project (Boston Globe,
October, 1987). Others, however, suggest that the City has the right to
change its vision for an area, particularly if the public has made its
opposition to the development clear. Steven Coyle admitted that the
City's approach was an aggressive one, but made no excuses for this
policy. The controversy over the redesign of the New England Life
Complex and International Place, both large-scale developments in
Boston, is evidence that it was not the first time that the Mayor and his
BRA director had reversed their positions on a large development
project following sustained criticism (Boston Globe, October 15, 1987).
The rise and fall of the Fan Piers Development raises some intriguing
questions about the development review process in Boston. Although it
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is still too early to understand why the Mayor and the BRA had
"sudden" change of heart, we can begin to hypothesize about certain
factors external to the development review process itself, that affected
the nature of the negotiations. Chapter Four describes. a variety of
factors external to the development review process, as well as project-
specific factors, that we believe had a major impact on the Fan Piers
negotiations.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FACTORS THAT AFFECTED THE
DEVELOPMENT REVIEW PROCESS
Development review, particularly that involving extensive negotiations,
does not occur in a vacuum. Most practicing planners across the
country would agree that the same project subject to the same
development review process would experience substantially different
outcomes in another time or place. Similar to other large-scale projects
across the country, the outcomes of the Fan Piers' negotiated
development review process were influenced by a number of factors
external to the review process itself. These include economic factors
such as the strength of the .office market, the perception of developer
profits, and local fiscal dependence on property taxes; and political
factors such as the Boston's mayoral race, tensions between state and
local officials and the strength of citizens' and special interest groups.
Certain project-specific qualities also may have influenced the outcome
of this particular development review. These include the mere size and
scale of the project, its exposure to the media, and the timing of the
development. This chapter briefly describes the economic, political, and
project-specific factors that influenced the nature and outcomes of the
development review process for the Fan Piers.
Economic Factors
Boston's Development Boom.
The strength of the local development market has a tremendous impact
on the nature of negotiated development review. Generally, cities
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experiencing slow-growth and downtown deterioration or abandonment
will allow numerous concessions and even offer incentives to
developers who are willing to build in the area. This was the case in
Boston in the 1960s when the local government provided all necessary
infrastructure improvements and substantial property tax benefits to
developers of such projects as the the Prudential Center and Faneuil
Hall Marketplace. On the other hand, when the market is strong and
development is booming, cities generally are in a position to demand
much larger concessions and significant exactions from developers.
Boston, today, is going through such a development boom with low
vacancy rates, extensive hotel, office, and retail construction, and
steady employment and population growth over the past decade.
The Fan Pier developers introduced their proposal for a 5 million square
foot mixed-use development along the Fort Point Channel at a time
when the City of Boston was experiencing unprecedented growth and
prosperity. After decades of declining employment and population,
Boston experienced a 12.2% increase in population between 1970 and
1980, and an 18% increase in employment from 511,000 jobs in 1976
to 605,000 jobs in 1986 (Brown, 1987). Boston's outstanding growth
economy was accompanied by an unprecedented boom of private
development activity as a surge of foreign investment flowed into the
market and builders scrambled to meet the increased demand for office,
commercial and hotel space. Office construction accelerated to a record
pace with approximately 8 million square feet and 5 billion dollars of
new development during the first half of this decade (Boston
Redevelopment Authority, Boston's Growth Economcy and the
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Megaprojects Dimension, p. 2). in 1984, Boston was ranked first among
the twenty largest American cities for square feet of construction per
capita (Brown and Perkins, 1985). In 1985, it commanded the highest
rental rates for Class A office space in the country (Brown and Perkins,
1985), yet vacancy rates remained a healthy 6.1% in mid-1987 (Boston
Redevelopment Authority, Boston's Growth Economcy and the
Megaprojects Dimension, p. 3). Hotel construction also responded to the
thriving economy with more than 5000 hotel rooms added between
1975 and 1986 (Brown, 1987). Business visitors, conventions, and
tourists were generating a continual demand for rooms allowing the
city's hotels to charge high rates and still maintain high occupancy. BRA
forecasts, asserting that Boston's booming growth would continue over
two more decades further fueled the optimism in the market.
Boston's unabated construction and development growth not only
generated an estimated 142,792 construction jobs and 223,720
permanent jobs between 1975 and 1989 (Arault and Johnson, 1987),
but also strengthened the City's negotiating stance with developers
eager to build in this hot Northeastern market. No longer desperate for
any development project that came along, the city could afford to be
selective and very demanding in terms of the project benefits, design
criteria, and mitigations required of the developer. The market was
perceived to be so strong that most developers would concede to the
City's demands even when they personally believe that they are
excessive. This clearly was the case with the Fan Piers Development.
98
Perceptions of Developer- Profits.
The inflationary 1970s, booming office market, and the large influx of
foreign investment into the local economy were precisely the factors
that led the public, as well as a number of public officials, to believe
that Boston's developers were reaping tremendous profits from their
development projects. The development community itself would often
protest that the public's perceptions of developers' profits were greatly
exaggerated. What profits existed, they reasoned, were just
compensation for the enormous risks that a developer had to undertake.
This perception that the developers would reap an enormous profit
from the Fan Pier development clearly prevailed among residents and a
number of governmental agencies throughout the development review
negotiations. It was well-known that Anthony Athanas had bought the
35 acres of land along Northern Avenue many years earlier for a fairly
small sum of money, and the future profit potential of the Fort Point
Channel area had been touted by the media and other developers for a
number of years. Like most business enterprises, few dollar figures
were actually published regarding the Fan Piers' developer profits,
which further fueled speculation
What is important, however, is not actual profits, but the public's and
government's perception of developer profits. The BRA, a sophisticated
planning agency, well-versed in the use of development pro-formas and
real estate financial analysis, could make accurate assessments of the
potential profits available to different developers. The public and many
other government agencies, however, had a tendency to exaggerate the
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potential profits. These perceptions, whether true or not, encouraged
the CAC, housing advocates, environmentalists, and others to take a
hard line in the negotiations, demanding considerable exactions from
the developers. Most of these groups assumed that the developers
could easily afford the added costs of mitigation measures and special
benefits.
City Reliance on Property Taxes.
Unlike the Boston's development boom and perceptions of profits,
Boston's strong reliance on property taxes for municipal funds
strengthened the developers' hand in the negotiations. Property taxes
are a major source of fiscal revenues in many cities, which is one reason
why new development is often keenly sought by city officials. Property
taxes play a particularly important role in maintaining the City of
Boston fiscally sound. In 1981, Boston's total general revenues
amounted to 984.1 million dollars; 361.6 million of these funds were
intergovernmental transfers and the remaining 495.8 million were
funded through local taxes (Brown and Perkins, 1985, p. 53). Property
taxes accounted for 98.8% of the City's tax revenues (Brown and
Perkins, 1985, p. 53) as compared to 55% in Dallas, 64% in Denver, and
48.4% in San Francisco. Thus, in Boston property taxes are the main
source of fiscal revenues for the City, supporting supporting schools,
police and emergency services, infrastructure improvements, and other
government expenditures.
The enactment of Proposition 2-1/2 by the Massachusetts legislature in
1980 severely limited the State and localities ability to increase existing
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taxes, hence new construction took on a more important role than ever
before. In Boston, the tax base was expected to grow by more than 60
million dollars due to new construction activity between 1977 and 1991
(Arault and Johnson, 1987). Over 20 million dollars in property taxes
were expected annually from the Fan Pier development alone. Boston
could not ignore its reliance on new developments like the Fan Pier to
generate much-needed additional funds for- the municipal coffers. - This
fiscal dependence on new development, strengthened the Fan Piers
developers' bargaining position considerably, as it was clear that the
City needed them as much as they needed the City.
In summary, the economic factors described above suggest that while
the development boom in Boston and perceptions of large developer
profits encouraged government officials and citizen groups to demand
significant exactions, the City's reliance on property tax revenues gave
the developer a strong hand in the negotiations as well. This
combination of economic conditions suggests that the City would push
for as many exactions as it could possibly achieve without killing the
project. As the negotiations continued over time the developers had
increasing sums of equity invested in the project, thus improving the
City's bargaining position and allowing it to request more and more
exactions. Political and project-specific factors, however, also affected
the outcomes of the negotiations. These are described below.
Political Factors
Planning is essentially a political process, and Boston is no exception.
Traditionally, politics in Boston have been colorful and openly
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controversial, with mayors wielding considerable power in the
development review process. Although less flamboyant than some of
his predecessors, Mayor Flynn clearly had an interest in closely
monitoring the development review process. While the -Mayor favored
the Fan Pier Development and helped move it along in its early years, in
1987 he exhibited a change of heart and on a number of occasions made
surprise announcements regarding the project. A number of political
factors may explain the these and other surprising turn of events These
include the mayoral race in Boston in 1987, tensions between state and
local officials, and the political activism of interest group coalitions.
Mayoral Elections.
Mayor Flynn, the "neighborhood mayor" first came to office in 1983.
Boston's neighborhood groups had charged in the 1970s that Mayor
Kevin White had actively promoted downtown development at the
expense of neighborhood revitalization (Susskind et al., 1986, p. 6) and
Flynn used this issue as his major campaign platform during the 1983
mayoral elections. Throughout the campaign, he promoted himself as a
populist candidate and the neighborhood mayor who would seek to
ensure that downtown's wealth was shared with the community. Flynn
won the elections and during his first term was widely perceived as a
mayor who gave the public easy access to City Hall. In the 1987
mayoral race, the popular Mayor was expected to win the elections
handily. The Boston Globe noted: "There is a strong feeling in the city
that it is being run with fairness and equity to all neighborhoods, and
with a sensitivity to various interests" (Boston Globe, July 4, 1987).
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During the 1987 mayoral race, however, opponent Joseph Tierney,
turned the tables on the "neighborhood mayor" when he attacked Flynn
for not scaling down the Fan Pier towers, which resided in his own
political backyard, South Boston (Boston Globe, October 16, 1987).
Tierney's criticisms that Flynn's policies favored downtown
development clearly stung the Mayor. In October, shortly before the
elections, Flynn made his surprise announcement requesting building
height reductions of up to two hundred feet for the Fan Piers' buildings.
The announcement came as a complete surprise to both the developers
and the CAC, as well as contradicting previous BRA positions regarding
the project's density, which would suggest that the decision was
primarily a political one, prompted by last minute jitters before the
mayoral elections. Flynn's demand for reduced building heights can be
viewed as primarily a symbolic action, designed to show that was still
indeed the "neighborhood's man". His unexpected public announcement,
however, gave the developers little room to maneuver in. All they
could do was hope that once the elections were over, Flynn could be
reasoned with.
The Organization of Citizen and Special Interest Groups
Mayor Flynn's stance throughout the negotiations was undoubtedly
influenced by the outspoken special interest groups, particularly
housing advocates, and neighborhood organizations that monitored the
Fan Pier review process. Boston has always been an ethnically
segregated city with close-knit neighborhoods such as the Italian North
End, Irish South Boston, Chinatown, and black Roxbury. While this has
caused divisions on a larger citywide scale, such homogeneity serves to
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reinforce neighborhood unity and collective action. Threatened by
rising housing prices, gentrification and displacement, new office
development, and deteriorating services over the past decade, Boston's
neighborhood began to organize. Today, these groups .have become a
force to be reckoned with. They are well-organized, diligent, and
quickly learn all of the intricacies of the development review process.
Mayor Flynn's election in 1983 and 1986 could be attributed to his
platform as the neighborhood mayor who would seek to share
downtown's wealth with the neigborhood groups. He actively courted
the neighborhood groups and relied on them for his support. The media
and local housing activists also supported the grassroots movement,
further legitimating citizens' role in the development review of the Fan
Piers. By placing citizen participation in the limelight, not only the
developers but also the BRA had to be wary of not stepping on toes
throughout the negotiations. Citizen groups and the media were seeking
proof that the City would indeed live up to its promises of letting the
neighborhoods have a piece of the development pie.
State-Local Tensions
Tensions between the local and state level agencies involved in the
review process also had an impact on the development negotiations.
The City was aware of the State's enthusiasm for the proposed Fan Piers
Project and sensed that it could pressure the State by holding back on
project approvals. Hence, in 1987, the Mayor and the BRA assumed a
tough stance on the traffic mitigation measures for the Fan Piers
Development, demanding that the State guarantee certain road and
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public transit improvements before the project could proceed any
further. The Boston Globe suggested that Flynn's hardline on public
transportation might have been an attempt to force Governor Dukakis
into accelerating the release of state funds to the city (Boston Globe,
October 15, 1987). Governor Dukakis, who was running for President of
the United States would surely seek to avoid the negative publicity
which a discontented Mayor of the state's largest city could generate.
Dukakis was also put in the position of having to keep a close eye on the
growing rivalry between Boston's Mayor Flynn and State Senate
President, Bulger, who were at odds with one another over a number of
Boston projects. Bulger openly supported the Fan Piers Project
pressing for the completion of the development review process, while
the Mayor increasingly opposed the proposed cultural facility (a pet
project of Bulger and Dukakis' wife, Kitty) and expressed concerns about
the impacts of the development. The friction between the two leaders
became increasingly public, making it difficult for either one to back
down from his stated positions gracefully and without a loss of power.
The Fan Piers, thus, became caught in the middle of these conflicts
between state and local political figures and had little choice but to wait
for them to settle their differences.
In summary, a series of political situations ranging from the Mayor's re-
election campaign to tensions between the Mayor and the State Senate
President, added a complicated new dimension to the Fan Piers
negotiations. Neither the BRA nor the developers nor the citizens
groups had any control over these situations, and thus were forced to
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adjust to the circumstances as they arose. The highly charged political
atmosphere tended to strengthen the hand of the CAC, which came
from South Boston, the Flynn, the and Bulger's home turf, but weaken
the hand of the developers, who found the process- riddled with
continual uncertainty.
Project-Specific Factors
A number of factors specific to the Fan Piers Development also
influenced the development review process. These include the scale
and density of the project, the way in which the development was
marketed, and the unique timing of the proposal with regards to
planning and development politics in Boston.
Project Scale and Density
With a proposed 5 million square feet of development and twelve
structures, the sheer size and scale of the Fan Pier Development placed
the project in a vulnerable negotiating position. The Fan Pier
Development was in the media continually from 1984 through 1988,
and received extensive scrutiny from all parties. Numerous studies and
analyses were demanded by the impact assessment process. Given its
large scale and potential for profit, the Fan Pier clearly had sufficient
up-front cash and a large enough staff to undertake these studies. The
developers ended up spending millions of dollars preparing impact
studies and mitigation analyses in one of the most thorough
development review procedures Boston had ever seen. Such intense
scrutiny and detailed analysis opened the door at every turn for
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criticism of the project. It is doubtful that a smaller project would have
been subject to such a thorough analysis.
As a large and relatively isolated project, the Fan Piers were also a
vulnerable target for heavy handed tactics by the City. As the
negotiations proceeded, the developers' investment in the project
became more and more costly, making it progressively more difficult
for them to withdraw from the deal when the City increased its
demands. Negative perceptions of developers in general made it
unlikely that any of the Mayor and BRA's increased demands would
trigger negative backlash from the public. It was in this context that
the City was able to take a surprising hard line on both building heights
and traffic mitigations in 1987.
Although it is not entirely clear why the City changed its stance towards
the Fan Pier, it is that Flynn and Coyle probably would not have
launched their attack on the Fan Pier Project unless the prey had
appeared vulnerable (Boston Globe, October 1987). There had been
rumors for some while among development circles that the project was
facing financial trouble and that a rift had developed between the
owner Anthony Athanas, Hyatt, and Friedman (Boston Globe, October
21, 1987). Friedmen had agreed to have substantial construction
underway by June 30, 1988 or Athanas could retain his development
rights. As development permits were delayed and accumulated, the
tension appeared to be mounting among the developers. If the Fan
Piers Development had been a less prominent, smaller-scale
development, it probably would have had less media exposure, a less
107
thorough impacts analysis, and less vulnerability to sudden political
maneuvers by the Mayor.
Marketing Techniques
The marketing and advertising of this project also had an impact on the
nature and outcomes of the development review process. In marketing
the Fan Pier Project, the developers faced a double-edged sword as they
attempted to deal with private-sector land interests and community-
wide concerns simultaneously. The developers of the Fan Pier portion
of the project tended to espouse one marketing approach, while the Pier
Four developers favored the other.
The first marketing strategy sought to inspire private sector interest
and financial institution confidence in the project by demonstrating
that the development would not be an isolated luxury structure amidst
a declining industrial district. Proper marketing called for glitzy
brochures which would illustrate the excitement and glamor of the one-
of-a-kind Fan Piers Developers. Investors and potential tenants would
have to be convinced that the the "mini-city of twelve buildings" would
be a successful, exciting project that would turn the whole Fort Point
Channel area around. This approach was espoused by the Fan Pier
developers, HBC Associates.
The flip side of the coin was that given the recent development boom
and growth of downtown Boston, the community was increasingly wary
of the advent of new, large-scale developments. Sensitivity to
community perceptions suggested a more subdued marketing strategy
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in which the phasing of the project over a ten year period and the
enormous benefits to the public would be emphasized. Less publicity,
according to this marketing strategy, would be better, especially during
the development review phase. This approach was espoused by the Pier
Four developers, the Boston Mariner Corporation.
Not surprisingly, the more colorful and controversial of the two
approaches was most widely publicized. Repeatedly, the Fan Pier was
touted as "a golden city by the sea ", a "wondrous new city", a "glorious
new creation" and "Boston's largest project ever" (Boston Globe, January
15, 1988). Rather than emphasizing that the project would be phased
over 10 years, there was an obsession with the size and scale of the
project (Boston Globe, January 15, 1988).- This packaging of the Fan
Piers was all wrong given the political context of the City at that
moment. While this approach might have been appropriate in the
sixties and early seventies when Boston was hungrily trying to attract
development to the downtown, it resulted in a negative image for the
Fan Pier in the environmentally-conscious 1980s. Thus, "despite
generous community benefits and famous architects, the Fan Pier
Project was criticized for trying to parachute a mini-Miami into South
Boston" (Boston Globe, January 15, 1988).
Project Timing
Finally, the timing of the Fan Piers Development also influenced the
development review process. The master plans for the Fan Piers
Development were submitted in 1985 at a time when the BRA and
development politics in Boston were beginning to undergo substantial
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change. Thus, the Fan Piers Development ended up serving as the
guinea pig for many of the BRA's new policies and also played an
important role as a precedent-setting project.
The BRA's newly formed policies did not seem to carry as much weight
as the actual precedent that would be set by the developer exactions
and project benefits. As the first project to undergo master plan
planned development approval, the BRA may have believed that the
development community would turn to the Fan Piers as a trendsetter ,
thus the entire process was designed to set a good example for future
development review. The Fan Piers were subjected to a thorough and
extensive environmental impact assessment review, which went the
extra step of requiring that the developers provide five special
mitigation studies after final EIR approval had been given. The
development was also subject to in-depth scrutiny by two designated
citizen groups, the CAC and the HPAC, part of an overall effort by the
BRA to include citizen participation as a formal component of the
development review process. Finally, exactions were also negotiated in
a wide range of areas suggesting that such public amenities, housing
provisions and developer contributions destined to become a
predictable component of all development negotiations in Boston. The
message being sent was clear--the BRA meant to do business--and the
Fan Piers Development was meant to set an example for others.
The Fan Piers Development was also reviewed concurrently with two
well-publicized and highly visible projects--International Place and
Rhowes Wharf--had received development approval. International
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Place, a one million square foot, granite and glass complex of office
buildings designed by Philip Johnson, was highly criticized by the press,
architects, and environmentalists as a monstrousity. The complex's
large scale and height, design, and lack of amenities were upheld by
many in the community as an example of poor planning and a
development review process which was not sensitive to the needs of the
City of Boston. Rhowes Wharf, on the other hand, was highly acclaimed
as an example of good planning and a the product of a fair and efficient
negotiated review prcess. This sixteen story, waterfront, mixed-use
development incorporated such details as a colonnaded public wald
through the development, a domed entrance courtyard, and 65% open
space. The success of the Rhowes Wharf development led BRA planners
to look to this project as an example of what could be done on the Fan
Piers site. The poor press that International Place recieved also
encouraged the BRA to begin to modify its standards and be more
stringent with density and height allowances. Thus, halfway through
the development review of the Fan Piers planners began to tailor their
design requirements to be more in line with the Rhowes Wharf project.
If the Fan Piers had been reviewed three years earlier, the developers
would not been dealing with the aftermath of the highly criticized
International Place nor the popularity of the new Rhowes Wharf
development.
Although the large-scale and timing of the Fan Piers development made
it vulnerable due to the intense public scrutiny and precedent-setting
nature of the case, there were also a few benefits for the development
team. The thoroughness with which the project was reviewed gave the
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developers' facts to back up their assertions and legitimacy at the
bargaining table. Furthermore, the thoroughness of the review process
made it difficult to accuse the developers of trying to cover up facts
about the project.
Conclusions
The negotiated development review of the Fan Piers did not occur in a
vacuum. Instead, a series of economic and political factors appear to
have had varying degrees of influence over the negotiations. Initially,
the City's dependence on new, large-scale construction for property tax
revenues, jobs, and linkage payments favored the developers' stance in
the negotiations. Thus, the City moved the project along fairly quickly,
despite concerns about its significant traffic impacts. As the developers
become increasingly financially entrenched in the project, however,
Boston's booming office economy, the public's perception of large
developer profits, the Mayor's campaign for re-election, and the
growing strength of citizen groups in the city, and the project's role as a
precedent-setter, encouraged both the BRA and the CAC to demand
more and more exactions from the developers. Furthermore, the large
scale, extensive media coverage, and flamboyant marketing of the Fan
Piers Development, combined with the visible tensions between the two
development teams, placed the project in the limelight. This intense
public scrutiny increased the developers' vulnerability in the
negotiations.
Although the thorough review process enhanced the developers'
legitimacy at the bargaining table and would certainly strengthen their
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hand in a court of law, it also created costly setbacks for the developers.
Presently, the project is on hold as the developers sue one another in
court, therefore it is impossible to tell what the outcome of this lengthy
development review will be. This hiatus in the review process,
however, provides an opportunity for some serious reflection on the
nature of development review in Boston in general and for the Fan Pier
specifically. Was the negotiated development review of the Fan Piers a
fair and efficient process for both the developers, the City and citizens?
What was the nature of policy linkages, procedural guidelines and
citizen participation for this case? Finally, how could Boston's
development review process for large-scale projects be improved?
Chapters Five and Six attempt to address these questions.
113
Chapter Five
An Assessment of
the Development Review Process
The three year development review of the Fan Pier Development has
been a complex and lengthy process, which has yet to reach a final
verdict. It is not too early, however, to begin to assess the development
review process and its tentative negotiated outcomes. The Fan Pier was
reviewed in the midst of a major transition period in planning and
development in Boston. Over the past five years policy and plan-
making have been emphasized, more orderly development review
procedures have been created, and citizen groups have become
increasingly involved in the development review process. What are the
implications of these changes for development review? Was the
development review of the Fan Pier a fair and efficient process? What
type of a precedent will this project set for other large-scale
development proposed for downtown Boston and the waterfront area?
This chapter turns to three important components of development
review--policy linkages, review procedures, and citizen participation--
in order to answer these questions.
Policy Linkages
A Transition Period for Policy-making
The Fan Pier Development appears to have been caught in the midst of
a transition in planning policy and hence, its developers and reviewers
found themselves in a unique situation. On the one hand, few formal
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written policies existed to guide the review of the site and so
negotiations between the BRA, CAC, and the developers were common.
On the other hand, the large scale and intense publicity of the Fan Pier
Development prompted the City to start creating formal plans and
policies for the area. Thus, we find that as the Fan Pier was undergoing
development review, policies and plans were simultaneously being
developed for the area.
These new policies evolved and changed as the negotiations were taking
place. Such a reactive planning process complicated the Fan Pier's
development review process considerably. The lack of existing plans
and policies for the site forced the City to play a constant game of catch-
up with the developers and to use delaying -_tactics in order to keep one
step ahead of them. When new policies and plans were devised, it was
never entirely clear which ones applied to the Fan Pier and which did
not. Hence, we find that the Fan Piers development review was
characterized by unstable exactions decisions and a highly
unpredictable review process. The developers and CAC had little
recourse for addressing the variable exactions because no official
policies existed to serve as a framework for decisions.
Why Policies Exist in Some Areas and Not Others
In assessing the Fan Piers development review, it is apparent that
policies were evolving more rapidly in some areas than in others. The
Fan Pier case tends to suggest that formal, clearly defined policies and
plans were most likely to exist for those issues which were a priority of
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the Flynn administration and in those cases where little controversy
existed.
Mayor Flynn, long touted as the "neighborhood mayor", has clearly
stated that social and economic equity are priority issues for his
administration. The Mayor and his planning director had a well-
formulated vision of Boston as a city where socio-economic
redistribution was possible. These visions of growth management and
economic equity began to take shape in the form of written and
informal affordable housing policies during Flynn's first administration.
Examples of this include the DIP linkage regulations and the informal
inclusionary housing policies. The City, however, was not able to
convert these socio-economic visions into a concrete physical plan for
growth management and development.
Some policy areas, such as waterfront access, were also more easily
addressed and less controversial than others, such as building height
and densities. Waterfront regulations had been provided with
considerable legitimacy during the early 1980s due to a decision by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court favoring public purpose uses for
the waterfront, the increased enforcement of Chapter 91 waterways
licensing procedures, and the establishment of the first permanent
office of Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management program (Kloster,
1986). In addition to this strong State support for waterfront
regulation, both citizens and the development community appeared to
agree that well-designed, waterfront developments with extensive
provision of public open space and maritime uses could be beneficial.
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Developers found such development projects lucrative, while the public
favored the increased amenities. This common agreement among state
and local authorities, citizen groups and activists, and the development
community made it relatively easy to create the strong set of
Harborpark guidelines for Boston's waterfront.
On the other hand, policy areas such as density and building heights,
were particularly controversial. Proponents of generous height limits
argued that large-scale projects were necessary to retain Boston's strong
market base and provide jobs for both construction workers and
permanent employees. Higher density projects are also more profitable
to the developer, tend to make significant contributions to the tax base,
and provide considerable linkage funds to the City's Neighborhood
Improvement Fund. Critics argued, however, that Boston's uncontrolled
growth was strangling the city, resulting in traffic congestion, monstrous
structures that were out of scale with Boston's historical character, and
displacement of lower income families. Torn between both the
numerous costs and benefits of high density projects, the City appers to
have avoided taking a firm stand on land-use and zoning for the
downtown and waterfront. Instead, the BRA preferred to rely on its
strong bargaining stance, due primarily to the booming office market, to
exact as many mitigations as possible from the developers of large-scale
projects.
Consequences of Mixed Policy Types
The reactive policy-making process of the BRA resulted in mixture of
formal, informal, and non-existent policies for the Fan Pier. This
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mixture of evolving policies had significant implications for the way
decisions were made for the Fan Pier. The developers and the CAC, for
instance, were uncertain about which policies were in effect and had to
be adhered to, and which were not.
Formal, written policies, which should have been clear and easy to
implement, were often as unpredictable as informal or non-existent
policies. For instance, in the case of affordable housing, the DIP
regulations clearly mandated that the developer had to contribute a fee
of five dollars per square foot to a fund for affordable housing.
Nonetheless, the negotiations were not closed on the topic of affordable
housing. Instead, a wide variety of additional affordable housing
concessions, ranging from additional monetary contributions to
inclusionary housing, were wrangled from the developers. In this case,
the existence of a clearly articulated policy apparently did not preclude
additional negotiations.
The creation of plans for the surrounding areas that exlcuded the Fan
Piers site also complicated the negotiations. By exempting the Fan Pier
site from plans, the BRA could use waterfront or Fort Point Channel
policies at its own convenience. Comprehensive area plans served as
rules of thumb for site-specific development review decisions if the
outcomes favored the BRA's position. However, the BRA could also
easily choose to ignore the area plans because they were not legally
binding on the Fan Piers site. The Harborpark guidelines, for example,
were used extensively when determining waterfront access benefits,
but played no role in the determination of building heights.
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In determining appropriate building heights, the BRA could have turned
to either the Harborpark guidelines or existing zoning regulations to set
a standard for the allowable heights on the Fan Piers site. Instead, the
BRA initially favored the develops' high density approach, and allowed
structures of up to 450 feet. Such heights are typical of downtown
Boston, where FARs of 10 and heights exceeding 400 feet are not
unusual. In late 1987, however, the City altered its course and
demanded a 200 foot reduction in building heights to 250 feet, resulting
in building heights similar to those of the popular Rhowes Wharf
waterfront development. Thus, we find that not only were well-defined
policies non-existent, but there were also continual changes in what
was acceptable. Informal policies such as the 10% inclusionary housing
requirement were also selectively enforced by the BRA. Such selective
use of plans resulted in unpredictable and unstable negotiated
outcomes.
In those cases where policies simply did not exist (and there were
many), there the players lacked a shared vision and a common ground
from which to begin the negotiations. In some cases, such as affordable
housing, this prolonged the negotiations as it was first necessary to
agree on what was an appropriate vision for the site before exactions
could be negotiated. Although the review of this very complex case
certainly would have been time-consuming under any circumstances,
the lack of a policy framework to begin with complicated and
lengthened the negotiations considerably.
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In other situations, such as the traffic impacts mitigations negotiations,
the lack of shared information and definitive standards placed groups
with little technical expertise, such as the CAC, at a disadvantage at the
negotiations. The CAC had to rely on the developers' technical studies
and the expertise of Transportation Commissioner Dimino because they
had few written standards and performance measures to guide them.
The developers, on the other hand, hired the traffic consultants and
thus, were able to control the number and types of traffic studies that
were performed. This unequal access to information favored the
developers in this case, but disempowered the CAC. Furthermore,
traffic impact issues were particularly complicated due to the City's
dependence on the State's transportation agenda.
Implications for the Different Players
Boston's reactive, "catch-up" planning, characterized by a mixture of
formal, informal, exclusive plan, and non-existent policies, has a number
of implications for the different participants in the development review
process. In the case of the Fan Pier Development, the lack of formal
plans and the context of constantly evolving policies, provided the BRA
with substantial flexibility and power in the development review
process. Both the developers and CAC, however, faced uncertainty and
an considerable future.
The Mayor and the BRA
In the short run, such uncertainty enhanced the bargaining power of
the BRA, because it allowed the Mayor and the agency to control the
negotiations. The BRA could change policies at will, and this served as a
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very strong incentive for the other parties to agree with its terms or
face even less favorable policies. In the long run, however, these tactics
may return to haunt the agency. The recent Supreme Court ruling in
Nollan vs. California Coastal Commission has made it clear that
exactions must be well-linked to the negative impacts that they
supposedly mitigate. Nollan and other cases suggest that the courts are
paying closer attention to the rights of property owners and now expect
municipalities to make decisions that are firmly grounded in existing
policies. Under present conditions, the BRA's basis for decisions is
unclear and the agency would find it difficult to defend its actions in
court. Negotiated agreements based on precedent and community
standards or a strong policy-framework would be more stable and less
vulnerable to future litigation measures by the different parties. The
BRA also runs the risk, in the long-run, of creating a bad image for itself
and the city of Boston with regards to development. If developers find
the BRA's policies to be too arbitrary and unpredictable, they will leave
and the BRA will have lost its main source of business.
The Developers
For the developers of the Fan Piers, the tremendous uncertainty and
unpredictable nature of the development review process led to costly
delays and unfair treatment in a number of cases. The lack of objective
and fair standards defined ahead of time, combined with the continual
evolution of new policies, forced the developers to negotiate in a virtual
policy vacuum, a very risky endeavor that resulted in numerous
setbacks between 1985 and 1988. Such poorly-articulated policies
suggest that only deep-pocketed developers, who are in favorable grace
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with the BRA and the Mayor will take the risk of going through the
development process. By limiting the development market to such an
exclusive group the city runs the risk of encouraging expensive
development projects and cronyism, while excluding smaller, start-up
firms from the market.
The CAC
The poorly-articulated policy framework both helped and hindered the
CAC in the Fan Piers negotiations. In certain areas, such as affordable
housing, the CAC found that the ambiguity of BRA policy-making,
allowed the citizens' group itself to take an active role in shaping
policies for the site. The Mayor's strong support and the CAC's pro-
active approach to development review made this strong policy-making
role possible. The general lack of policies, however, also frustrated the
CAC. Its members had very little objective criteria to guide them in
their decisionmaking which was particularly disadvantageous in
technical areas such as traffic mitigation. This lack of standards, a
policy-framework, and a common ground to start from served to
disempower the CAC.
The City of Boston
Poorly-defined policies impacted not only the Fan Pier negotiations, but
also, in the long-run, have overall planning and development review for
the City of Boston. When project review is based solely on the
individual costs and benefits of the development at hand , the city runs
the risk of ignoring the larger picture and pandering to special interest
groups whose interests do not necessarily reflect the overall needs of
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the community. Without a comprehensive, far-sighted vision for an
area, there is no overall understanding of how development projects
will work together. Policy-making should be a pluralistic process which
includes developers, citizens, non-profit groups an-d government
officials, but it should be comprehensive in nature and take place before
projects are set in motion rather than simultaneously with the
development review.
Today, after three years of concurrent negotiations and planning, there
are still no official BRA guidelines for the development of the Fan Pier.
However, the CAC, originally created as a citizen advisory council for the
Fan Pie, has now undertaken the task of creating a master plan and
IPOD for the Fort Point Channel area, including the Fan Pier site. The
changing role of the Fan Pier CAC from a purely reactive, site-specific,
advisory council to a committee with a pro-active role is one clear sign
that someone has realized that there is a need for a stronger policy
framework for development review. It is not clear to any of the
parties what impact, if any, this new IPOD will have on the future
development review of the Fan Pier.
Development Review Procedures
A Transition Period for Development Review Procedures
Like policy-making, procedures for local development review, were in a
state of transition when the Fan Piers negotiations took place. After
years of ad hoc reviews on a case by case basis, the BRA had begun to
attempt to codify the development review process. New zoning tools
such as PDAs and DIPs were added to the traditional menu of zoning
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variances and exceptions. These special zoning designations still
allowed for considerable discretionary administrative review, but were
an attempt at creating a more orderly and predictable procedures for
development review. Thus, in many ways, these tools -were a hybrid
between the traditional rigid regulations of Euclidean zoning and the
flexible and ad hoc techniques of negotiated development review.
The Fan Pier Development was the test case for one of these new zoning
techniques: the Master Plan Planned Development Area. As a new
way of doing business, the development review procedures for the Fan
Pier were characterized by tension between the traditional BRA process
of ad hoc, site-specific negotiations and the Steven Coyle's expressed
desire to create an orderly, well-documented development review
process in which all of the rules of the game were known in advance.
In attempting to balance this tension between flexibility and
predictability, the BRA created a set of procedures which were at times
unpredictable and unclear to the participants. The open-ended nature
of these procedures had both positive and negative consequences for
the development review of the Fan Pier.
Predictability of the Review Process
The MPDA procedures outlined in BRA documents appeared to clearly
outline a development review process where the approval of the
master plan locked in uses and density, while the development plan
vested developer rights to the approved building footprints, heights,
and setbacks. However, the sudden reduction in building heights of the
Fan Pier in October of 987, following prior approval of the developer's
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development plan, suggests that the City did not believe that
development rights were vested until much later in the review process.
By reducing building heights after the PDA development plan had been
approved, the City was suggesting that development rights would not
vest until the Mayor gave his final approval to the Fan Pier after all
other reviews had been completed. Under these open-ended
circumstances, the developers and CAC had no assurance that mutually
agreed-upon exactions in the Cooperation Agreements or design
standards in the development plans were permanently guaranteed.
The City was able to get away with such inconsistency because all
players well knew that the city could hold up the process for years.
In the case of the Fan Pier because both the developers and the CAC
were led to believe that firm procedural guidelines had indeed been
established. The parties negotiated under the assumptions that the
rules of the game were well known to all, only to later discover that
new rules could be (and were) added to the review process. The Fan
Pier is only one of a number of recent development projects in Boston to
experience sudden changes in standards and procedures long after the
development review process has gotten underway. In 1987, for
instance, a large-scaled plan for the expansion of the Prudential Center,
initially supported by the City, was sent back to the drawing board after
loud neighborhood protests. Recently, a project on 116 Huntington
Avenue was also approved by the City and then sent back to the
drawing board, again due to vocal opposition by neighbors. Similarly,
Phase II of International Place, a large-scale office development in
Boston's financial district, was recently reopened for discussion.
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Through such actions, the BRA has sent a message that despite new,
more orderly review procedures, changing the rules of the game after
the process is underway is still considered an acceptable practices.
Legal Issues
The BRA and the Mayor's change in direction halfway through the
negotiations raises serious legal questions with regard to vested rights.
Over the past few decades, American courts have addressed the issue of
vested rights on numerous occasions. Until the rights vest to develop
land, developers are subject to the legitimate police power qualifications
of the local governmental planning agency. Both developers and
neighborhood groups should know ahead of time when rights will vest
so that they can plan their negotiating strategies accordingly.
Developers desire the security of knowing that their rights to develop
are secured and recognized early in the process. Citizen groups prefer
to delay the vesting of rights as long as possible, but also desire the
security of knowing that once a regulation or exaction has been
imposed, it will be adhered to. Planning agencies such as the BRA
attempt to maintain control over the review process for as long as
possible by delaying the vesting of rights. In the case of the Fan Piers,
it would appear that the BRA not only delayed vesting the developers'
rights, but it actually misled the developers into believing that their
rights would vest with development plan approval, when they did not.
Issues of Fairness and Efficiency
The BRA's ability to unilaterally modify decisions long after agreements
have been hammered out by multiple parties also raises serious
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questions about the fairness and the efficiency of the current
development review process. The Fan Piers development review
process allowed for different standards and procedures to be applied
over time to the case. For example, the initial phases of development
review suggested that a three step process based on the master plan,
development plan, and design review would form the basis for review.
These review procedures would include substantial CAC participation,
submission of specific plans for approval, and public hearings.
However, Mayor Flynn's surprise decision in October of 1987
demonstrated that ad hoc, administrative discretionary decisions had
also become acceptable procedures. Such unexpected changes in
procedure imposed from above by the BRA also created long and costly
delays to the review process, thereby reducing its efficiency.
In Boston, review procedures have also varied across developments at
the discretion of the BRA. The role of citizen participation in recent
projects has varied considerably, for example. This is not to say that
the Fan Piers development should have had the same exact
development review negotiations as other projects in Boston, however,
general procedural guidelines should have served as a framework for
the project so that all of the players could have known what to expect.
The treatment of the Fan Pier developers should have been consistent
over time and with other large-scale projects in Boston.
Accountability
Finally, in the case of the Fan Pier, the lack of predictable procedures
resulted in very little accountability among the players. The BRA, for
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instance, never approved or rejected the proposed Fan Pier Project.
Instead, the agency and the CAC simply made more and more demands
of the developers as the became increasingly financially entrenched. It
is possible that they were trying to raise the ante for a long enough
period of time, to slowly strangle the Fan Piers project rather than
directly kill it. Such a slow death would have been far more politically
palatable to the Mayor and the BRA than a direct disapproval, since the
public's perception then would be that the project had died because the
developer could not agree to the agency's terms. Thus, unpredictable
procedures may shift the perceived responsibility for decisions to the
developer's shoulders, thus absolving the municipality of any
responsibility for its decisions..
Clarity of Procedures
Although the steps to be undertaken in the development review were
clearly established in the PDA guidelines, a number of procedural issues
remained undefined throughout the development review of the Fan
Pier. In initiating the Fan Piers development review process in 1985,
no one was sure which issues would be explored, what studies would be
made, or how long the process would take. The role of citizen
participation was not described in writing at all, although the leaders of
the CAC had verbally been given a hazily-defined mission. The first
three issues are discussed below, while the role of the CAC is explored
in the later "citizen participation" section of this chapter.
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Selection of Issues
Both the state MEPA and the local PDA review processes established a
broad framework for the issues to be addressed, but left the choice of
specific topics up to the participants in the development review process.
The state level MEPA process focused on these issues through scoping
sessions, whereas the CAC played an influential role in choosing issues
for the local PDA process. Both processes allowed the developer to
work closely with the neighborhood association and the BRA to identify
important issues and focus on those of most concern to the parties. In
the local PDA review, however, there was no explicit process for how or
when the group would go about choosing the relevant issues. This less
clearly-defined local process ran a greater risk of certain outspoken,
special interest groups dominating the review sessions by focusing all of
the attention on their specific cause. This occurred to some extent in
the Fan Pier as a small contingent of Fort Point Channel artists managed
to make their plight a central concern of the CAC. A similar situation
arose when the media and housing activists pushed to have affordable
housing included on the site, even though both the CAC and the
developers did not desire this alternative.
Impact Studies
In the state EIR process, report formats and methodologies were
established ahead of time the developers assumed responsibility for all
studies and technical analyses necessary for completion of the draft and
final environmental impact reports. This task was never clearly
assigned in the local PDA review process. There were no guidelines
establishing how many or what type of studies were appropriate. No
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were there any procedural guidelines establishing a process by which
these issues could be determined. Instead, as the need for studies arose
over time, they were assumed by consultants according to the
developers' standards.
This lack of clarity regarding impact studies had a number of
implications for the negotiations. First, the developers' studies formed
the basis for all negotiations and thus, left little room for joint
information gathering. Assumptions and methodologies employed in
these studies were heavily debated, particularly with regards to traffic
impacts. This created numerous delays in the process and may have
also been unfair as the BRA and the CAC never had the opportunity to
undertake their own analyses of the case. Second, the developer was
responsible for financing all of the studies and was subjected to new
delays each time a new study was demanded. As there was no limit on
the number or type of studies, the BRA and CAC continued to ask to
analysis after analysis in order to obtain a detailed understanding of
development impacts. While allowing for a thorough review of the Fan
Piers' costs and benefits, these additional studies also resulted in costly
delays for the project.
Time Horizons
While the state-level review process clearly-specified time limitations
for development review, the PDA process had few specific deadlines to
meet. One process was limited significantly by rigid time horizons while
the other was open to abuse due to the lack of any deadlines. The
specific limitations which the MEPA process imposed on the Fan Pier's
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development review encouraged an efficient and speedy review of
project. Time limitations made the review process predictable and
ensured the developer and other parties that the review would not drag
on endlessly and without resolution of key issues. However, some cases,
such as the Fan Piers, are far too large and complex to be neatly placed
into such a specific time framework. In the case of the state level
review of the Fan Piers, many groups lacked sufficient time to review
the large, complex and technical impact reports, thus the pre-
established deadlines had to be extended in order to allow for a more
thorough review of the issues.
In the local review process, on the other hand, few specific deadlines
existed. Thus, the parties were able to thoroughly explore the issues.
Without any time framework, however, the developers argued that the
review process was excessively thorough and demanded more
information than was necessary. Such requests for additional studies
may have been used as delaying mechanisms in order to allow the City
to work on policies or responses to the plans.
As can be seen by the above discussion of issues, impact studies, and
time horizons, the PDA review process was fairly flexible and thus
allowed the participating parties to tailor the negotiations to the specific
case at hand, the Fan Piers Development. This allowed for a more
efficient and fair process because the specific issues, studies, and
deadlines were not arbitrarily determined ahead of time. However, the
lack of any definition of a procedure for deciding on these issues would
be determined also allowed certain parties, such as the CAC, to dominate
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the negotiations and encourage an excessively thorough and time-
consuming review. In another development project, it could easily be
the developer who would dominate, and hence, push for a minimal
number of studies for efficiency's sake. In this case, a. -process should
have been clearly established ahead of time in which all parties could
agree upon these trade-offs between efficiency and thoroughness of
review.
The Role of Citizen Participation
Citizen Participation in Transition
As was true with policy issues and procedural guidelines, the role of the
Fan Piers CAC was never clearly established beforehand. No written or
Yerbal guidelines were every provided to the CAC concerning its degree
of involvement in the review process, ability to negotiate with the
developers, role in the EIR process or its authority to speak for the
community. Thus, provided with little guidance, the CAC set out to
shape its own role in the review process and assumed a very active and
vocal stance in the negotiations.
CAC's aggressive approach to development review greatly influenced
the degree of public scrutiny, thoroughness and length of the public
review process. The CAC was also more influential in some areas than
others, which raises a number of questions regarding the committee's
legitimacy. These issues are discussed below.
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Public Scrutiny
The active involvement of the CAC in the development review served to
publicize the bargaining process and make it open to intense public
scrutiny. On the one hand, such media exposure and publicity
protected the bargaining process from secret deals and maneuvers by
the BRA and the developers. The public negotiations gave the
developers added legitimacy later in the process as they could honestly
claim to have revealed their intentions. On the other hand, this
exposure put all of the players under intense pressure to perform
according to certain public expectations. Being in the limelight, made it
much more difficult for the CAC to compromise on issues that the media
portrayed as being critical. The BRA also sought to put its best foot
forward, and saw the Fan Pier as a precedent setting project by which
it could set a new tone for development in the City. Thus, it too was
under public scrutiny and pressured to ensure that the developers were
responsive to the neighborhood's demands.
Thorough Review of the Issues
The new emphasis on citizen participation increases the fairness of the
process by exposing the development project to the opinion and input of
all relevant stakeholders. Issues that might never have been addressed
through a traditional review process--housing for artists and South
Boston residents, for example--were satisfactorily incorporated into the
development agreements. By incorporating the citizens' voice into the
process early on, before crucial decisions were made, the likelihood of
future litigation by irate citizen groups was also minimized. Others
suggest, however, that the citizen participation element was excessive
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and allowed every group imaginable to express its own specific
interests with little concern for the overall costs or benefits to the
community or the developer. The intense publicity given to the Fan
Piers Development review process also made it easy for some of the
more vocal groups to hold the developers hostage to their demands.
Furthermore, the CAC appeared at times to have no limits and explored
every possible issue of interest with regard to the Fan Piers.
Length of the Review Process
While the involvement of the CAC prompted a very thorough
development review both at the state and local levels, it also lengthened
the review process considerably, resulting in time-consuming and costly
delays to the developers, whose upfront costs were enormous. The CAC
was eager to get to the matters at hand, particularly in the early stage
of the process, and expected to complete the development review in
five months. Even under Larry Dwyer's able hand, this speedy review
was not possible. The initial rapid pace of development review began
to diminish as the CAC's scrutiny became more thorough and eventually,
the citizens who had time on their side, learned that the threat to slow
the review process down was a very powerful one. These short-term
delays, however, may pay off for the developers in the future. In the
long-run, an early consensual approach suggests that future litigation is
less likely.
Why the CAC Had More Impact in Some Areas than Others
The CAC made its biggest dent on the review process in the area of
waterfront access and affordable housing benefits. The first issue had
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considerable policy-backing and existing standards from the
Harborpark guidelines. Housing was a favorite project of the Mayor and
an issue that received considerable attention from the press. There
were also a number of very vocal members or regular attendees of the
CAC meetings who served to bring the issue of affordable housing to the
forefront of the negotiations.
The CAC appears to have had less direct input in the negotiation of
issues demanding more technical expertise and quantitative analysis,
such as traffic mitigations. Although this was the issue of greatest
concern to the South Boston community, Commissioner Dimino of the
Boston Transportation Department took control, leaving the CAC in a
reactive rather than a pro-active role. Although the CAC expressed
concerns about the density of the project on numerous occasions, they
again were not directly responsible for the final major reduction in
heights in 1987. The issue of heights and densities appears to have
been squarely under the control of the BRA and the Mayor.
Questions of Legitimacy and Empowerment
It is clear that the support of Mayor Flynn, who appointed the CAC's
members, was critical to the committee's success. Thus, the question
arises has to how much power the CAC actually had. Did it influenced
the process on its own right or did its power base essentially flow from
the Mayor? Some evidence suggests that the CAC's legitimacy did
indeed stem from the Mayor's support. The Mayor designated all of the
members of the CAC and hand-picked its chairman, Larry Dwyer, who
was considered by many to be a rising star in the Flynn administration.
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This alone, gave the Mayor considerable control over the committee.
Furthermore, the Mayor's sudden decision in October 1987 to reduce
the height of the Fan Pier hotel after the CAC, BRA, and developers had
agreed to the conditions of the PDA development. -plan, sharply
undercut the perceived legitimacy and power of the citizen group.
Members of the CAC, however, strongly feel that the citizen
participation process empowered them and their committee. Although
the Mayor appointed them, they note that the committee was so
diligent, hard-working, and well-informed that within a year it had won
its own credibility and legitimacy. One member asserted that the CAC's
strength came from its thorough knowledge of the Fan Piers case and
ability to address both the BRA and the developers on any of the
project's details. Regardless of where their power came from, it is clear
that the CAC played a significant role in the development review of the
Fan Piers Development.
Conclusions
The Fan Piers Development underwent its three-year review during a
major transition period for planning in Boston. New policies were being
devised, new review procedures were appearing on the books, and
citizen advisory committees were increasingly active in project review.
In Boston, the character of development review is still evolving, but this
case study of the Fan Piers has provided some insights on both the
strong and the weak points of the process as it currently exists.
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Some elements of the development review process suggest that the Fan
Piers had the potential to be a fair and efficient review process with
stable outcomes. The flexible nature of the review process for the Fan
Pier allowed for pluralist decision-making. Many players participated
in the development review, shaping the final exactions and mitigation
techniques and achieving creative outcomes through consensus-
building. Satisfactory trade-offs appear - to have been reached for the
PDA development plan phase of review, with the developer providing
extensive housing and public waterfront access benefits in exchange for
increased density of development on the site and minimal traffic
mitigations. Furthermore, the state level environmental impact review
process was well-integrated with the local PDA review process with the
extensive findings of the EIR process serving as a springboard for
negotiations between the developers, the CAC and the BRA. The EIR
process was designed to inform decisionmakers of the different costs,
benefits, and impacts of different project alternatives. In this case it
appears to have worked well.
Unfortunately, the lack of a policy framework, well-defined procedural
rules, and a clear definition of the role of the CAC robbed the
development review process of its legitimacy. A comprehensive
approach to development was missing, and the few policies that existed
were applied haphazardly to this project. Sudden changes in
procedural rules in mid-stream created an unpredictable and uncertain
process. Catch-up policy-making, and unclear rules resulted in costly
delays which wielded little valuable information to the players.. The
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BRA wielded excessive administrative discretion exists, while the CAC
was left to its own devices to proceed essentially as it saw fit.
The lack of a policy framework, clearly defined procedures and the
well-articulated role for the CAC left the outcome of the Fan Pier review
process strictly to the bargaining power of the parties to the
negotiations. In Chapter Four, we noted that as economic conditions,
political circumstances, and project specifics varied over time,
bargaining strength shifted from one party to another. Thus, we find
that the trade-offs made during the Fan Piers negotiations directly
reflect the relative power of the CAC, the developers, and the BRA at
different points in the three year development review process. In the
case of the Fan Pier, we find that the developers moved from a position
of strength in the early stages of development review to one of relative
weakness towards the end. The CAC, on the other hand, moved from
relatively little power to an increasingly influential role, but then
towards the end appeared to have been robbed of its credibility. The
BRA was able to retain its strong bargaining position throughout the
negotiations because of the boom in office development in Boston and
its control over policy-making and development review procedures.
For years, the BRA has been criticized by developers, architectural
critics, environmentalists, and other advocates for its ad hoc
development review process, where rules are rarely defined and
discretionary power is retained until the end by the powerful planning
agency. Today, the BRA has begun to implement plans and .policies, new
review procedures, and increased citizen participation efforts in order
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to counter such allegations. The evidence of the Fan Pier case, suggests,
however, that with the exception of increased citizen participation, little
has changed. Without a well-defined policy and procedural framework,
negotiated development review in Boston still remains -an unfair and
inefficient process with unstable outcomes. It is uclear whether the
current situation is merely the reflection of a transition period from ad
hoc review to a more orderly process, or whether the BRA intentionally
plans on maintaining its powerful role under the guise of new policies
and procedures. The next five years should provide some answers to
this question. Recommendations for improving this process are
provided in Chapter Six.
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Conclusion
Recommendations
The following recommendations suggest ways to modify Boston's
development review process so that both the process and its outcomes
will be more fair and efficient for all of the players.
1) Boston needs to create ~ a development review process that
combines flexibility with consistency and predictability.
Boston needs to create a balanced development review process in
which there is neither total flexibility with a free license for ad hoc
administrative rule-making nor rigid classifications and specifications
that restrict innovation and lead to drabness. Flexible techniques are
necessary in a large project like the Fan Pier, but both the public and
developers need assurance that flexible review techniques will be
designed and administered fairly, competently, and visibly. In order to
assure some predictability and consistency across cases, administrative
review needs to be based on a publicly adopted plan which details a
shared understanding of a vision for the development of the city .
2) Boston needs to create a policy framework for its planning
and development decisions.
Too few plans and policies are created in Boston ahead of time. The
BRA's emphasis should be shifted away from individual project
reviews, which are too often based on variable policies and
assumptions, and towards the creation of community plan that can
serve as a foundation for growth management. Such comprehensive
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policies would embody an assessment and prioritization of community
needs. The creation of departmental or systems plans, capital
improvement programs, clear facility and service standards, inventories
of existing facilities, population forecasts, and studies -of anticipated
community growth would form the basis for a more comprehensive
community plan.
Policies play an important roe in negotiated development by
establishing a framework within which to negotiate. By establishing
goals and objectives, policies can help the players to identify possible
trade-offs in the negotiations. Good policies provide for consistency of
the general rules, while allowing exactions to vary according to the
specific nature of the case. Such a planning policies may enable or
prohibit certain ranges of activities, but they do not need to go as far as
to tell developers specific actions that must be taken. These details are
left to the negotiations so that consensual, creative solutions can be
developed. Thus, the existence of a policy framework allows the BRA,
CAC, and developers to consider exactions and mitigations in light of the
fundamental underlying problems, rather than being led astray by
political and profit motivations.
Such a policy framework will enable planners to make fairer and more
efficient decisions. Well-articulated policies can provide uniformity
among different cases and also reduce the number of surprises in the
bargaining process. A strengthened policy base will also provide
planning decisions with greater legitimacy and credibility. Explicit,
comprehensive policies allow the courts to judge the validity of
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municipal decisions as the rational for exactions and mitigations is
clearly stated.
3) The public should be involved in the creation of planning
policies for the city of Boston.
One of the aspects of the Fan Pier development review process that
appealed to many of its participants was that it was a pluralistic process
that allowed for the input of many different parties. This democratic
process is important as no one person or agency can correctly identify
what the future holds or what use and density are best for different
areas of the City. The public should be actively involved in and
publicly debate policy-making for the planning and development of
Boston. However, policy-making should be undertaken separately and
distinctly from the development review process. This is now beginning
to occur in the Fort Point Channel area as the CAC has shifted its focus
from project-specific, reactive planning to a more comprehensive and
pro-active role in planning for future development in all of Fort Point
Channel. A model exists here for other neighborhood policy and plan
making the the city.
4) The broad rules of development review in Boston should be
clearly laid out ahead of time in a written document. The
specific procedures to be followed should be jointly
determined at the beginning of the process by the BRA, the
developers, and the citizen advisory committee. Once
cstablished, the broad rules and specific procedures should
be adhered to unless all parties agree to a change.
The BRA has begun to outline some broad rules for development review
in its PDA and MPDA guidelines as well as the more recent Chapter 31
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process which parallels the steps of the state and national EPA
processes. These broad procedural guidelines are an improvement
over past ad hoc reviews, but should be expanded to include a
definition of the parties to be involved and their roles in the process.
However, specific procedural issues such as the agenda of specific
issues, studies to be undertaken, and the timeline and groundrules for
negotiations may vary across cases in response to the specific
circumstances of the development project. These specifics should be
discussed and agreed upon by the relevant parties at the beginning of
the review process.
5) Boston's development review procedures should clearly
establish when development rights become vested.
A greater element of certainty and predictability needs to be built into
Boston's review process. Written development review guidelines should
specifically establish when development rights become vested (upon
approval of the PDA development plan, for instance), how agreements
will be publicly ratified, and how the exactions will be transformed into
legally enforceable guarantees. Neither the developers, the citizen
group, nor the BRA should be allowed to modify the exactions after
development rights have been vested unless all parties agree to the
changes.
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6) Citizen advisory committees should be incorporated into
the written guidelines for the development review process as
a legitimate and active participant in the process. The citizen
advisory committee should then meet with the - developers and
the BRA early in the process to clarify its role in the review
process.
The CAC played a key role in the development review of the Fan Pier,
but legally had no status in the review process as its legitimacy
stemmed solely from their appointment and support by the Mayor. The
PDA procedures should acknowledge the existence and the validity of a
citizen advisory committee in the review process, but leave the
determination of the CAC's specific role up to the players in the
negotiations. The players will want to tailor the CAC's role according to
the nature and objectives of its members, the scale and complexity of
the development project, and the specific concerns of its constituency.
The determination of the CAC's role should be made early in the
process, however, in order to reduce the opportunity for abuses by any
of the parties.
The CAC should be composed of a mixture of mayorally-appointed
members representing special interest groups and the community
(environmental, housing, etc.) and neighborhood elected members. This
will help to ensure that the CAC is not dominated by political appointees
or radical elements with a very narrow focus.
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7) The citizen advisory committee should be obligated to hold
regular public meetings with the larger community.
The citizen advisory committees play an key role in this process, but
raise an important question regarding who indeed speaks for the
community. It is essential that large, community-wide public meetings
be held on a regular basis in order to provide both the public and the
CAC with information and feedback on the development project. The.
role of the CAC is to speak for the community and unless, the select
committee is in continual contact with its constituents, it may lose the
neighborhood's perspective on the project.
Concluding Remarks
Today, Anthony Athanas and the Fan Pier developers, HBC Associates,
are still in court, locked in a bitter and fierce battle over the rights and
responsibilities of each party. Many observers suggest that the demise
of the Fan Piers Development is imminent. If the project does fall apart,
however, there is little doubt that sooner or later someone will choose
to build on these very desirable 35 acre site adjacent to downtown
Boston. Would such future developers of the Fan Piers experience a
similar development review process? This thesis suggests that they
would not. Negotiated development review in Boston is highly
susceptible to the prevailing economic and political conditions of the
moment, as well as certain project-specific characteristics. Development
review in Boston is also undergoing an apparent transitions stage.
Presently, the BRA's planning policies are in a state of continual change
and development review procedures are highly unpredictable. Finally,
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citizen participation is only as significant as the advisory committees
themselves make it. In conclusion, the potential developers of the Fan
Piers site face an uncertain future. The only thing that is clear is that
development review still remains very much under the .control of the
BRA.
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Acronyms
BRA: Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston's planning and
development agency
CAC: Citizen Advisory Committe, citizens committee designated by
the Mayor to review the Fan Piers Development
DEIR: Draft Environmental Impact Report, first step of the state and
federal environmental impact review process
EIR: Environmental Impact Review, mandated by federal and state
regulations
FEIR: Final Environmental Impact Report, second step of the state
and federal environmental review process
HPAC: Harborpark Advisory Council, citizens council designated by
the Mayor to plan for waterfront areas
PDA: Planned Development Area, Boston zoning designation for a
planned-unit development
PUD: Planned Unit Development, a large-scale, master planned
development project
148
APPENDIX B
149L
Public Benefits
The public benefits generated by the Fan Pier/Pier 4 project are
substantial. This project creates important job opportunities
for Boston residents in both construction and permanent jobs.
HOUSING
o Housing Linkage: $15 million
The City's goal is to maximize affordable housing in the
project. Programs to create or rehabilitate units in South
Boston could be implemented to achieve this goal.
o The developers have proposed 100 units affordable/elderly
hou'sing in Building F
o The arts community has proposed 30-40 units artists housing
o The BRA has proposed 150 units of first-time affordable
housing for home buyers between old and new Northern Avenue
JOBS
o Jobs linkage: $3 million
o 10,000 permanent jobs created
o 3,400 construction jobs created
o Commitment to Boston Residents Construction Employment Plan
which requires 50% Boston resident employment, 25% minority
employment and 10% women employment-.
o Commitment to Employment Opportunity Plan on permanent jobs
PUBLIC/CULTURAL FACILITY
o 85,000 SF cultural facility located on Fort Point Channel
could house the Institute of Contemporary Art, a restaurant,
and possibly performing space. Developers should contribute
land for this project.
TAXES
o $17,614,000 expected property tax yield (expressed in
dollars of constant value at 1986 prices with stabilized
yield commencing in 1994)
PUBLIC AMENITIES
o 1i mile Harborwalk
o 11 acres public open space *
o 185 marina slips (25% short term)
o fishing pier
o water transportation docking facilities; on-demand water
taxi
o outdoor amphitheatre
o public dinghy dock
o childrens play area
o sculpture garden
*includes paths, sidewalks, pedestrian wavs, landscaped
area, and the pool; excludes roads, service areas, lagoon,
and other open water.
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Community Process
The Citizens Advisory Committee
o To advise the Authority on design issues, community bene-
fits, and the impacts of the proposed development, the Mayor
established a Fan Pier and Pier 4 Citizens Advisory
Committee in August 1985 to work with the Harborpark
Advisory Committee.
o The CAC has been in the process of reviewing the proposed
development for almost two and a half years. The CAC has
held over 50 committee and sub-committee meetings and have
been represented at several other community meetings.
o The following organizations and individuals participate in
the CAC:
o Tom Butler, South Boston Citizens Association
o Gerry Vierbickas, South Boston Residents Group
o Dan Yotts, South Boston Community Development
Corporation
o Representative Flaherty; Martin Nee, alternate
o Father Walter Martin
o Larry Bluestone; Felicia Clark, alternate, Boston
Society of Architects
o James Sullivan; Simone Auster, a-lternate,Chamber of
Commerce
o Tom Ennen, Boston Harbor Associates
o Adel Foz, Massport
o Al Raine, Governor's Office of Economic Development
o Bob Costello, St. Vincents Neighborhood Association
o Robin Peach, Fort Point Arts Community
o The members of the Harborpark Advisory Committee;
Lorraine Downey, Chairperson,
o Larry Dwyer, Chairman
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6A-1, 6A-2
tARTICLE 6A
OTHER EXCEPTIONS
($Article inserted on April 30, 1968)
tSECTION 6A-1. Authorization for exceptions in Planned Develop-
ment and Urban Renewal Areas. As provided for in Section 10 of Chapter
665 of the Acts of 1956, as now in force or hereafter amended, and subject
to the provisions of Sections 6A-2, 6A-3 and 6A-4, the Board of Appeal may,
in a specific case after public notice and hearing, allow an exception from
the provisions of this code. Such exception shall lapse and become null and
void unless (a) such exception is used within two years after the record of
said Board's proceedings pertaining thereto is filed with the Building Com-
missioner pursuant to Section 8 of said Chapter 665, or (b) such exception
relates to work in a planned development area of not less than 5 acres, or to
the use thereof, and within such two year period the Boston Redevelopment
Authority files with the Building Commissioner a certificate that work within
said planned development area has been commenced and is diligently pro-
ceeding in which case such exception shall not lapse unless thereafter said
Authority files with the Building Commissioner a certificate that such work is
not diligently proceeding.
($As amended on December 29, 1982)
4SECTION 6A-2. Procedure for Appeal. Each
appeal for an exception shall be filed in quadruplicate
with the Building Commissioner, who shall retain
one copy for his files and transmit the other
copies as follows: one to the Board of Appeal,
one to the Boston Redevelopment Authority, and
the other to the Zoning Commission. Said Authority
shall, within thirty days after the date of such
transmittal, file with the Board of Appeal a
report with recommendations, together with
material, maps, or plans to aid :he Board of
Appeal in judging the appeal and determining
what conditions and safeguards may be necessary
or appropriate. The Board of Appeal shall not
i 28
6A-3
hold a hearing nor render a decision on an appeal for an exception
until such report with recommendations has been received and
considered, provided that if no such report is received within said
thirty days, the Board of Appeal may hold a hearing and render
its decision without such report.
(4As amended on May 26, 1970)
tSECTION 6A-3. Conditions Required for Exception. The
Board of Appeal shall allow an exception only -if it finds:
(a) That such exception is in harmony with the
general purpose and intent of this code;
(b) The exception requested is in conformity with
(i) the development plan for the planned develop-
ment area or (ii) the land assembly and
redevelopment or urban renewal plan, or the low
rent housing project or housing project for elderly
persons of low income for the urban renewal area,
and such conformity has been certified to by the
Boston Redevelopment Authority; and
(c) If such exception relates to a Development
Impact Project, as defined in Section 26-2, the
applicant shall have complied with the
Development Impact Project Requirements set
forth in Section 26-3.
($As amended on December 29, 1983)
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The boundaries of these districts are hereby originally
established as shown on a series of maps entitled "Zoning
Districts City of Boston," dated August 15, 1962, on file in the
office of the City Clerk, which maps, with all explanatory matter
thereon, and all maps which, by amendment of this code, may be
substituted therefor or made supplemental thereto shall be
deemed to be, and are hereby made, a part of this code.
(tAs amended on February 17, 1971, March 20 and May 26,
1972, July 9 and September 27, 1973, October 22, 1974,
February 28, 1979, October 31, 1980, and June 16, 1982)
tSECTION 3-1A. Special Purpose Overlay Districts. A
subdistrict or part thereof or a contiguous group of subdistricts
or parts thereof may be designated as a special purpose overlay
district as follows: (a) planned development area (distinguished
by the addition of the letter "D" to the designation of the
subdistrict or subdistricts); (b) urban renewal area (distinguished
by the addition of the letter "U" to the designation of the
subdistrict or subdistricts); (c) adult entertainment district(distinguished by the addition of the letter "E" to the designation
of the subdistrict or subdistricts); (d) restricted and limited parking
districts; (e) flood hazard district; (f) institutional district; (g) re-
stricted roof structure district (distinguished by the addition of an
asterisk or small circle to the designation of the subdistrict or
subdistricts; or (h) interim planning overlay district. In an overlay
district the regulations specified for the base subdistrict or
subdistricts shall apply, insofar as they are not in conflict with
special regulations specified.for a particular overlay district.
(tThis section, inserted March 24, 1977, incorporates districts
formerly described in Section 3-1. The first paragraph was
subsequently amended on June 8, 1977, August 20, 1981,
December 30, 1983, and November 23, 1984.)
ta. Planned Development Areas. The whole or any part
of a subdistrict may be established as a planned development
area if such area contains not less than one acre and the commis-
sion has received from the Boston Redevelopment Authority, and has ap-
proved, a development plan or, if the area contains not less than five acres
and is not located in a residential zoning district, a master plan for the devel-
opment of the planned development area. Before transmittal to the commis-
sion, such development plan or master plan shall have been approved by
said Authority after a public hearing, provided, however, that no develop-
ment plan or master plan shall be approved by said Authority unless said
i 17
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Authority finds that such plan conforms to the general plan for the city as a
whole and that nothing in such plan will be injurious to the neighborhood or
otherwise detrimental to the public welfare. A development plan shall set
forth the proposed location and appearance of structures, open spaces and
landscaping, proposed uses of the area, densities, proposed traffic circula-
tion, parking and loading facilities, access to public transportation, proposed
dimensions of structures, and may include proposed building elevations,
schematic layout drawings and exterior building materials, and such other
matters as said Authority deems appropriate to its consideration of the pro-
posed development of the area.
(f the area contains not less than 5 acres and is not located in a resi-
dential zoning district, a master plan may be submitted setting forth only a
statement of the development concept, including the planning objectives
and character of the development, the proposed uses of the area, the range
of dimensional requirements contemplated for each of the proposed uses,
the proposed phasing of construction of the development and such of the
other items set forth above as said Authority may request in order to make
its required finding. No work shall proceed in any planned development area
established by the commission on the basis of an approved master plan un-
til a development plan for the area, or portion thereof in which work is to
proceed, conforming to the foregoing requirements has been approved by
the Authority and the commission, in each case after a public hearing.
To insure that no work proceeds other than in accordance with an ap-
proved development plan, no structure shall be erected, reconstructed, or
structurally changed or extended in a planned development area, whether or
not a master plan has been approved for such area, unless all drawings and
specifications therefor shall have been subjected to design review and ap-
proved by said Authority. The Building Commissioner shall not issue any
building or use permit with respect to any building, structure, or land within
a planned development area unless the Director of said Authority has certi-
fied on the application therefor and on each and every plan filed with the
Building Commissioner in connection therewith that the same is consistent
with the development plan for such planned development area or the portion
thereof to which said permit relates. Except as otherwise provided in Article
6A, planned rdevelopaent areas shall be subject to all the provisions of this
code applicable to the subdistrict in which the area is located.
(tAs inserted on July 2, 1968, and amended on December 29, 1982)
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